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Abstract
We consider an illiquid financial market where a risk averse investor has to liquidate a portfolio within a
finite time horizon [0, T ] and can trade continuously at a traditional exchange (the “primary venue”) and
in a dark pool. At the primary venue, trading yields a linear price impact. In the dark pool, no price
impact costs arise but order execution is uncertain, modeled by a multi-dimensional Poisson process. We
characterize the costs of trading by a linear-quadratic functional which incorporates both the price impact
costs of trading at the primary exchange and the market risk of the position. The liquidation constraint
implies a singularity of the value function of the resulting minimization problem at the terminal time T . Via
the HJB equation and a quadratic ansatz, we obtain a candidate for the value function which is the limit
of a sequence of solutions of initial value problems for a matrix differential equation. We show that this
limit exists by using an appropriate matrix inequality and a comparison result for Riccati matrix equations.
Additionally, we obtain upper and lower bounds of the solutions of the initial value problems, which allow
us to prove a verification theorem. If a single asset position is to be liquidated, the investor slowly trades
out of her position at the primary venue, with the remainder being placed in the dark pool at any point in
time. For multi-asset liquidations this is generally not the case; it can, e.g., be optimal to oversize orders in
the dark pool in order to turn a poorly balanced portfolio into a portfolio bearing less risk.
1 Introduction
In the last years, equity trading has been transformed by the advent of so called dark pools. These alterna-
tive trading venues differ significantly from classical exchanges and have gained a considerable market share,
especially in the US. Dark pools vary in a number of properties such as crossing procedure, ownership and
accessibility (see Mittal [2008] and Degryse et al. [2009b] for further details and a typology of dark pools).
However, they generally share the following two stylized facts. First, the liquidity available in dark pools is
not quoted, hence making trade execution uncertain and unpredictable. Second, dark pools do not determine
prices. Instead, they monitor the prices determined by the classical exchanges and settle trades in the dark pool
only if possible at these prices. Thus, trades in the dark pool have no or less price impact.1
In this paper, we are concerned with the solution of a stochastic optimal control problem in continuous time
arising in the context of optimal portfolio liquidation if an investor has access both to a classical exchange (also
called “primary venue” or “primary exchange”) and to a dark pool.2 We study a continuous-time model for
optimal liquidation of a portfolio consisting of n assets within a finite time horizon [0, T ] reflecting the trade-off
between execution uncertainty of dark pool orders and price impact costs of trading at the primary venue. It
complements the model by Kratz and Schöneborn [2012], where (in particular) multi asset liquidation in dark
pools is studied in discrete time; for single asset liquidation, the two models are connected via a convergence
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1 For empirical evidence of lower transaction costs or price impact of dark pools compared to classical exchanges see, e.g., Conrad
et al. [2003] and Fong et al. [2004].
2 The overall liquidity traded in dark pools in the US is strongly fragmented among approximately 40 different venues, see
e.g., Carrie [2008]. Therefore, liquidity aggregation is a major issue. Ganchev et al. [2010] and Laruelle et al. [2011] establish
learning algorithms to achieve optimal order split between dark pools. Instead of analyzing the simultaneous use of several dark
pools, we consider such an “aggregated” dark pool in our model which we call “the dark pool”.
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result. The mathematical analysis of the continuous-time model is substantially different from the discrete-
time model. In discrete time, the optimal liquidation strategy and its costs are given by a backward recursion
obtained by standard dynamic programming; this recursion is rather unhandy and it is difficult to deduce
properties of the optimal strategy from it. In continuous time, the liquidation constraint imposes a singular
boundary condition for the value function and therefore the problem cannot be solved by standard methods
of stochastic control. Instead, these methods had to be modified and extended. The optimal strategy and the
value function are characterized via the “principal solution” of a matrix differential equation. We believe that
the analysis of the differential equation and the resulting verification theorem for the optimization problem is
mathematically interesting in its own right. Additionally, the differential equation is easier to analyze than
the (discrete-time) backward recursion and we can deduce additional properties of the value function and the
optimal strategy from it; in particular, we are able to show that for a two asset portfolio, the optimal strategy
is monotone in the correlation of the assets. To our best knowledge, the mathematical framework established
here and in Kratz and Schöneborn [2012] is the first within which optimal trade execution is analyzed for a
multi asset portfolio using a classical exchange and a dark pool simultaneously.
Our model for trading and price formation at the classical exchange is a linear price impact model. Trade
execution can be enforced by selling aggressively, which however results in quadratic execution costs due to a
stronger price impact. We model order execution in the dark pool by an n-dimensional Poisson process. Orders
submitted to the dark pool are executed at the jump times of the respective components of the process. The
split of orders between dark pool and exchange is thus driven by the trade-off between execution uncertainty
and price impact costs.
The investor aims to maximize her expected proceeds minus a quadratic risk term. For appropriate assump-
tions on the price dynamics, this yields a linear-quadratic cost functional. However, the liquidation constraint
implies a singularity of the value function at the terminal time T , which renders the solution of the optimiza-
tion problem difficult. We approximate the constraint by a sequence of modified unconstrained optimization
problems with increasing finite end-costs. Via a quadratic ansatz, the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation suggests that the value functions of the modified optimization problems are quadratic forms
for matrix-valued functions which are the solutions of initial value problems for a specific matrix differential
equation. Explicit solutions for these initial value problems are not known. We establish a matrix inequality
which allows us to apply a known comparison result for Riccati matrix differential equations in order to obtain
closed form upper and lower bounds for the solutions of the initial value problems. The bounds are important
for several reasons. Firstly, they enable us to prove a verification theorem for the modified unconstrained opti-
mization problems with finite end-costs. Secondly, they imply the existence of the limit of the solutions of these
optimization problems and thus yield a well-defined candidate for the value function of the original optimization
problem with liquidation constraint. Thirdly, the limit of the bounds transfers to bounds for this candidate
value function and we deduce a verification theorem for the solution of the optimal liquidation problem.
Hence, the value function of the problem is a quadratic form for a matrix-valued function which is the
“principal solution” of the matrix differential equation. The optimal strategy is linear in the portfolio position;
it is determined by the value function and can be computed easily from a numerical solution of the “principal
solution” of the matrix differential equation. This makes the model tractable for practicable applications and
allows us to investigate the properties of the solution. When a position in a single asset is to be liquidated,
the current asset position is at all times being offered in the dark pool, while it is liquidated in parallel at
the primary exchange. The opportunity to trade in the dark pool leads to a slower liquidation at the primary
exchange compared to a market without a dark pool. Traders hence need to fundamentally adjust their trade
execution algorithms when a dark pool is introduced. It is not sufficient to use an algorithm that was optimal for
execution at the exchange and to add a component that also places trades in the dark pool; instead, trading at
the exchange needs to be adjusted during the entire trade execution time interval. While in a single asset setting
the entire asset position is placed in the dark pool, this is not true if a multi asset portfolio is to be liquidated.
If, e.g., the portfolio is balanced and thus only exposed to little market risk, then a complete liquidation of the
position in one of the assets is unfavorable and thus only a fraction of the entire portfolio should be placed in
the dark pool. This highlights again that overly simple adjustments to existing trade execution algorithms are
exposed to potential pitfalls. For dark pools, the reluctance of traders to place balanced portfolios in a dark
pool is an incentive to offer balanced executions in order to attract more liquidity.
Our paper is connected to several lines of research. First, it builds on research on optimal trade execution
strategies for a single trader in models with exogenously given liquidity effects. Several such models have been
proposed for classical trading venues, e.g., Bertsimas and Lo [1998], Almgren and Chriss [2001], Almgren [2003],
Obizhaeva and Wang [2006], Schied and Schöneborn [2009], Alfonsi et al. [2010] and Schied et al. [2010]. We
2
follow Almgren and Chriss [2001] and assume a linear temporary price impact model for the primary venue. This
choice yields a tractable model which nevertheless captures price impact effects. Linear price impact models have
become the basis of several theoretical studies, e.g., Almgren and Lorenz [2007], Carlin et al. [2007], Schöneborn
and Schied [2009] and Rogers and Singh [2010]. Furthermore, they demonstrated reasonable properties in real
world applications and serve as the basis of many optimal execution algorithms run by practitioners (see e.g.,
Kissell and Glantz [2003]; Schack [2004]; Abramowitz [2006]; Leinweber [2007]). The models above are limited
to trading on one venue; they are concerned with the trade-off of execution costs versus market risk. By using
a dark pool, the investor additionally faces order execution risk in our model. The trade-off of execution costs,
market risk and execution risk is also apparent in the models of Bayraktar and Ludkovski [2012] and Guéant
et al. [2012] who consider optimal liquidation with limit orders.3 In these models, the investor choses a limit
price for her orders; the “probability” of execution is then dependent on this price and the left-over position can
be liquidated at fixed costs at the exchange. In contrast to this, the dark pool orders in our model do not involve
a limit price; they are executed at the price of the primary venue. The continuous-time model studied in our
paper complements the discrete-time analysis of Kratz and Schöneborn [2012] for the specific case of linear price
impact and no adverse selection. Klöck et al. [2012] also work in a market model with exogenously specified
liquidity characteristics for both a public exchange as well as a dark pool. Their focus is on the circumstances
that can lead to price manipulation, while we focus on the quantitative and qualitative features of optimal trade
execution strategies in markets without price manipulation. Therefore they investigate a more general class of
price impact relationships, while our framework incorporates several aspects of market and investor behavior
that shape optimal trade execution, such as risk aversion, multiple correlated assets and a dynamic usage of the
dark pool.
A second line of research connected to our paper focuses on the underlying mechanisms for illiquidity
effects. Early examples include Kyle [1985], Glosten and Milgrom [1985] and Grossman and Miller [1988]. In
these models, price impact arises endogenously through the interplay of market participants. More recently,
such models have been proposed to analyze the competition between classical trading venues and dark pools.
Hendershott and Mendelson [2000] analyze the interaction of dealer markets and a crossing network4 in a static
one period framework where each investor buys or sells a single share. Their findings include that trading in a
crossing network is cheaper than in dealer markets since the trader saves half the spread, but trade execution is
uncertain in the crossing network. In a similar setting, Dönges and Heinemann [2006] focus on game-theoretic
refinements in order to remove the multiplicity of equilibria in Hendershott and Mendelson [2000]. Degryse et al.
[2009a] introduce a dynamic multi-period framework and compare the effect of different levels of transparency
of the dark pool. In order to focus on the optimal order execution of an individual trader, we exogenously
specify the liquidity properties of the market. Hence, all the models cited above, can shed more light on how
the liquidity properties of the dark pool come about than our model can. On the other hand, by defining the
model parameters exogenously, we can allow the investor to split her orders over time as well as between the
two trading venues. While executing her order over time, she can dynamically react to the existence or absence
of liquidity in the dark pool and adjust her trading strategy accordingly. Furthermore, we can take a multi
asset perspective and investigate how the composition of basket portfolios influences optimal trade execution
strategies.
Methods of stochastic control is a third line of research that this paper is connected to. A standard reference
for stochastic control with jumps is the book by Øksendal and Sulem [2007]. The liquidation constraint yields
a singularity of the value function at the terminal time T , and thus, the resulting stochastic control problems
require non-standard considerations. For single asset liquidation and finite end-costs (hence no singularity
of the value function at time T ), the solution of the linear-quadratic control problem is well-known, see, e.g.,
Øksendal and Hu [2008]. Multi-dimensional linear-quadratic control with jumps is treated in the book by Hanson
[2007]. However, our setting (even without the singularity of the value function) is not covered therein. The
difficulty in our setting stems from the combination of the singularity of the value function and the fact that
we consider multi-dimensional portfolios; thus the solution of the optimization problem involves the detailed
analysis of a specific non-Riccati-type matrix differential equation, for which we establish existence results and
upper and lower bounds of the solution by means of a novel matrix inequality. We are aware of only few other
texts dealing with singular boundary constraints in liquidation problems. Schied et al. [2010] study optimal
liquidation without dark pools for CARA investors. In this case the optimal control problem does not include
jumps. They carry out a verification argument for a candidate value function given in closed form. Naujokat
3In our model all orders in the primary venue are market orders whose execution is guaranteed; hence, the execution risk only
applies to the dark pool orders.
4Crossing networks are specific types of dark pools that offer periodic matching of buy and sell orders.
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and Westray [2011] and Höschler [2011] treat similar control problems with jumps. The focus of both texts is on
trading with limit orders rather than with dark pools; they only treat single asset trading and obtain the single
asset case of this paper as special cases of their respective settings. Kratz [2012] generalizes the single asset
case of this paper by allowing for adverse selection; this renders the liquidation problem non-linear quadratic;
he shows that in this case the value function is a “quasi-polynomial” of degree two instead of being quadratic;
the solution for the multi-dimensional case it not known yet.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We specify the model setup and the optimization
problem in Section 2 and obtain a candidate for the value function of the unconstrained optimization problem
with finite end-costs via an initial value problem for a matrix differential equation. In Section 3, we state the
main theoretical results of the article: the solution of the initial value problem (Section 3.1), the solution of
the unconstrained optimization problem (Section 3.2) and finally the solution of the constrained optimization
problem (Section 3.3). We discuss the properties of the value function of the optimal strategy extensively for
a single asset position and a portfolio consisting of two assets in Section 4. The main results of Section 3 are
proven in Section 5 and the results of Section 4 are proven in Section 6.
2 Model description
For a fixed time interval [0, T ], we consider the stochastic basis (Ω,F ,P,F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ])5. We investigate a
market model where a risk averse trader with a personal risk aversion parameter α ≥ 0 has to liquidate a
portfolio x ∈ Rn of n assets within a finite trading horizon [0, T ]. The investor has the possibility to trade
simultaneously at a traditional exchange and in a dark pool, facing the trade-off of paying market impact costs
in the traditional exchange against uncertain execution in the dark pool.
We specify the price dynamics at the primary exchange in Section 2.1 and the dynamics of order execution
in the dark pool in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3 we define admissibility of trading strategies. In Section 2.4, we
specify the trading objective and show that the resulting optimization problem is equivalent to a linear-quadratic
optimization problem. Heuristic arguments suggest that the value function of the optimization problem is
singular at terminal time T because of the liquidation constraint. Hence, we introduce a modified optimization
problem where we drop the liquidation constraint and approximate it by finite end-costs for a portfolio not
liquidated by time T as an intermediate step. In Section 2.5 we derive a candidate for the value function of the
modified optimization problem via a quadratic ansatz and the corresponding HJB Equation.
2.1 The primary exchange
In absence of transactions of the investor, the fundamental asset price at the primary exchange is given by an
n-dimensional stochastic process P˜ .
Assumption 2.1. We assume that P˜ satisfies the following properties.
(i) P˜ is a square-integrable càdlàg martingale.
(ii) The covariance matrix of P˜ is constant in time, i.e., for all t ∈ [0, T ], i, j = 1, . . . , n,
Cov
(
P˜i(t), P˜j(t)
)
= tΣi,j
and Σ = (Σi,j)i,j=1,...,n ∈ Rn×n.
As the time-horizon for portfolio liquidation is usually short, i.e., several hours or a few days, the martingale
property in Assumption 2.1 (i) does not constitute a major divergence from reality.6 Once the trader becomes
active on the primary exchange, she influences the market price P . We assume that the trader at the primary
exchange can only execute trades continuously, i.e. that her trading activity on the primary exchange is abso-
lutely continuous and can hence be described by her trading intensity ξ(t) with t ∈ [0, T ). This trading in the
traditional exchange generates price impact, which we assume to be temporary and linear in the trading rate
ξ(t). Given a strategy (ξ(t))t∈[0,T ], the transaction price at time t ∈ [0, T ] is given by
P (t) = P˜ (t)− Λξ(t),
5The filtration is generated by the involved random processes and is specified at the end of Section 2.2
6We do not model the period in which the investor has held the assets before time zero. For this period, the martingale
assumption is naturally a worse approximation of reality.
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where Λ ∈ Rn×n is a positive definite matrix constant in time. Execution of the trades at the primary exchange
is certain; we hence consider only market orders and no limit orders.
By assuming linear price impact for the primary venue, we follow Almgren and Chriss [2001]. This choice
yields a tractable model which nevertheless captures price impact effects. Linear price impact models have
become the basis of several theoretical studies, e.g., Almgren and Lorenz [2007], Carlin et al. [2007], Schöneborn
and Schied [2009] and Rogers and Singh [2010]. Furthermore, they demonstrated reasonable properties in real
world applications and serve as the basis of many optimal execution algorithms run by practitioners (see e.g.,
Kissell and Glantz [2003]; Schack [2004]; Abramowitz [2006]; Leinweber [2007]). In contrast to Almgren and
Chriss [2001], the price impact in our model is purely temporary; Klöck et al. [2012] analyze the influence of
permanent price impact on the existence of market manipulation strategies. Such an analysis is not in the scope
of our article; hence we allow only for temporary price impact.7
2.2 Order transaction in the dark pool
In addition to the primary exchange, the trader can also use a dark pool. Dark pools often have rather complex
order allocation mechanisms; most of them use some sort of a pro-rata or time-priority rule for matching orders
from opposite sides of the market. Here, we consider a dark pool with a time-priority matching rule: the
investor’s order η enters a queue and is matched with liquidity from the opposite side of the market (if there is
any) once it has reached the front of the queue.
We allow for continuous updating of the orders η(t) in the dark pool at any time t ∈ [0, T ]. Orders for the
ith asset in the dark pool are executed fully at the jump times of the ith component of an n-dimensional Poisson
process
pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) with intensities θ1, . . . , θn ≥ 0, respectively.
Else, the orders are not executed at all. This mechanism implies two main simplifications of reality which
allow a thorough mathematical analysis of the model. First, we exclude partial execution; the probability of
execution does not depend on the size of the order. Second, we assume independence of the increments of the
dark pool liquidity. On the other hand, the resulting model captures the stylized facts outlined above and in
the introduction; we believe that it constitutes a sufficiently well approximation of reality for our purposes.
Assumption 2.2. We assume that pi satisfies the following conditions.
(i) pi1, . . . , pin are independent.
(ii) pi and P˜ are independent.
By Assumption 2.2 (ii) we exclude correlations between dark pool liquidity and the fundamental asset price
in the market. In particular, this rules out adverse selection8. For single asset liquidation, adverse selection
was incorporated by Kratz [2012]. This renders the liquidation problem non-linear quadratic; he shows that in
this case the value function is a “quasi-polynomial” of degree two instead of being quadratic. A solution for the
multi-dimensional case it not known yet.
While the dark pool has no impact on prices at the primary venue, it is less clear to which extent the price
impact of the primary venue Λξ(t) is reflected in the trade price of the dark pool. If for example the price
impact is realized predominantly in the form of a widening spread, then the impact on dark pools that monitor
the mid quote can be much smaller than Λξ(t). We will make the simplifying assumption that trades in the
dark pool are not influenced by the price impact at all, i.e., that they are executed at the fundamental price
P˜ . If alternatively the transaction price in the dark pool is the price P at the primary exchange including the
trader’s price impact, market manipulation strategies can become profitable unless the parameters are chosen
with great care, as has been shown by Kratz and Schöneborn [2012] for the discrete-time case. For a detailed
discussion see also Klöck et al. [2012] who analyze the circumstances that can lead to price manipulation in
dark pools.
We are now ready to specify the filtration (Ft)t as the completion of
(
σ
(
P˜ (s), pi(r)|0 ≤ s ≤ t, 0 ≤ r < t))
t
.
7As the price is not influenced permanently by the investor, the term price impact might be misleading. Alternatively, we could
rename the quadratic costs caused by trading in the primary venue as the execution costs of the investor; indeed, the costs of
trading can be interpreted to include such different effects as price impact and transaction costs. However, the term execution
costs does not capture the possible impact of trading in one asset on the price of another asset which we include by allowing the
off-diagonal elements of Λ to be non-zero (cf. the discussion of cross price impact in Section 4.2.2).
8Here, adverse selection refers to the phenomenon that liquidity seeking traders find that their trades in the dark pool are usually
executed just before a favorable price move, i.e., exactly when they do not want them to be executed since they miss out on the
price improvement.
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2.3 Admissible trading strategies
Let t ∈ [0, T ) be a given point in time and x ∈ Rn be the portfolio position of the trader at time t. The trader
has the possibility to trade asset k in the traditional exchange with trading intensity ξk(s) at time s ∈ [t, T )
and to place orders ηk(s) in the dark pool at time s.
We call a 2n - dimensional stochastic process
(u(s))s∈[t,T ) = (ξ(s), η(s))s∈[t,T )
a trading strategy if ξ is progressively measurable and η is predictable. Given a trading strategy u, the portfolio
position at time s ∈ [t, T ) is given by the following controlled stochastic differential equation:
dXu(s) = −ξ(s)ds− η(s)dpi(s)
Xu(t) = x
(1)
such that the left hand side in (1) is well-defined.
For technical reasons we require all trading strategies to fulfill the following conditions.
Definition 2.3. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ Rn be fixed. Let u = (u(s))s∈[t,T ) = ((ξ(s), η(s)))s∈[0,T ) be a trading
strategy, i.e., ξ is progressively measurable and η is predictable.
(a) We call u an admissible trading strategy if it fulfills the following conditions.
(i) The Stochastic Differential Equation (1) possesses a unique solution on [t, T ).
(ii)
E
[ ∫ T
t
‖ξ(s)‖42ds
]
<∞, E
[ ∫ T
t
‖η(s)‖82ds
]
<∞.
(iii) If θi = 0, then ηi(s) = 0 for all s ∈ [t, T ).
We denote the set of admissible trading strategies by A˜(t).
(b) We call u ∈ A˜(t) an admissible liquidation strategy or just liquidation strategy if additionally
(iv) lims→T−Xu(s) = a.s.
and denote the set of admissible liquidation strategies by A(t, x).
Let us shortly comment on Definition 2.3. Condition (ii) is required for the moment bounds in Lemma 5.5
which is in turn needed for the verification later. Condition (iii) is needed in order to ensure uniqueness of
optimal trading strategies: if θi = 0, no additional gain can be achieved by non-zero dark pool orders. If the
portfolio is liquidated at constant speed at the primary exchange only, i.e., ξ(s) = xT−t , η(s) = 0 for s ∈ [t, T ),
Definition 2.3 (in particular the liquidation constraint (iv)) is satisfied and hence A(t, x) 6= ∅.
Remark 2.4. We expect that the stochastic control problems we solve are such that the optimal control is of
Markovian form (see, e.g., the book by Øksendal [2007], Theorem 11.2.3):
u(s) = (ξ(s), η(s)) = (ξ(s,X(s)), η(s,X(s−))
for deterministic functions ξ, η : [t, T )×Rn → Rn. The deterministic initial value problem
X ′ = −ξ(·, X), X(t) = x (2)
possesses a unique solution on [t, T ) if ‖ξ(s, y)‖ ≤ f(s)‖y‖+ g(s) on [t, T )×Rn for f, g ∈ C([t, T )) and ξ(s, ·)
is locally Lipschitz (e.g., C1).9 Let ξ : [t, T ) × Rn → Rn fulfill these conditions and let η : [t, T ) × Rn → Rn.
We can pathwise construct the solution of the Stochastic Differential Equation (1) inductively by interlacing the
jumps (see, e.g., Applebaum [2004], Example 1.3.13): as the n Poisson processes are independent, they jump at
distinct times almost surely. Let (τi)i≥1 be the jump times of pi such that t =: τ0 < τ1 < . . . almost surely, and
let X be the solution of the Initial Value Problem (2) on [τi, τi+1 ∧ T ) with initial value x = X(τi) for i ∈ N
such that τi ≤ T . For τi+1 ≤ T and ∆pik(τi+1) > 0, we set
X(τi+1) := X(τi+1−)− ηk(τi+1, X(τi+1−))ek,
where ek is the kth unit vector.
9This follows, e.g., by Peano’s existence theorem and Gronwall’s inequality.
6
2.4 Cost functional
The proceeds of selling the portfolio x ∈ Rn during [t, T ] according to the strategy (u(s))s = (ξ(s), η(s))s ∈
A(t, x) are given by
φ(t, x, u) :=
∫ T
t
ξ(s)>(P˜ (s)− Λξ(s))ds+
∫ T
t
η(s)>P˜ (s)dpi(s).
The first term in the above equation represents the proceeds of selling at the primary exchange at a price of
P (t) = P˜ (s)−Λξ(s), while the second term accounts for the proceeds of selling in the dark pool at the unaffected
price P˜ (s). Applying integration by parts and using Xu(s) = x− ∫ s
t
ξ(r)dr− ∫ s
t
η(r)dpi(r), Assumption 2.1 (i),
the fact that P˜ and pi are independent (Assumption 2.2 (ii)) and the liquidation constraint (Definition 2.3 (iv)),
we obtain
φ(t, x, u) = −
∫ T
t
ξ(s)>Λξ(s)ds+ x>P˜ (t) +
∫ T
t
Xu(s−)dP˜ (s).
This yields (cf. Assumption 2.1)
E
[
φ(t, x, u)
]
= x>P˜ (t)− E
[ ∫ T
t
ξ(s)>Λξ(s)ds
]
.
Instead of maximizing expected proceeds, we can thus equivalently minimize expected price impact costs. We
assume that the trader is not only interested in expected liquidation proceeds, but in addition also wants to
minimize risk during liquidation. We incorporate both aspects in the following cost functional:10
J(t, x, u) := x>P˜ (t)− E[φ(t, x, u)]+ E[α ∫ T
t
Xu(s)>ΣXu(s)ds
]
= E
[ ∫ T
t
f(ξ(s), Xu(s))ds
]
,
where f : Rn×Rn → R is given by f(ξ, x) := ξ>Λξ+αx>Σx. The first two terms in the cost functional capture
the expected liquidation shortfall, while the last term is an additive penalty function α
∫ T
t
Xu(s)>ΣXu(s)ds
which reflects the market risk of the portfolio (recall that α ≥ 0 is the risk aversion parameter of the investor);
it penalizes slow liquidation and poorly balanced portfolios. It does not incorporate execution risk; hence the
investor is only risk averse with respect to market risk but not with respect to execution risk. In discrete time,
Kratz and Schöneborn [2012] argue that for realistic parameters, market risk outweighs execution risk;11 we
hence expect that the inclusion of risk aversion with respect to execution risk would not change the optimal
strategy in essence. For deterministic liquidation strategies without dark pools, the risk term reflects the variance
of the liquidation costs (see Almgren and Chriss [2001]). In this case, minimizing a mean-variance functional
of the liquidation costs over all deterministic strategies is equivalent to maximizing the expected utility of the
proceeds of an investor with CARA preferences over all strategies (see Schied et al. [2010]).
We assume that the trader aims to minimize the cost functional and hence considers the following optimiza-
tion problem:12
v(t, x) := inf
u∈A(t,x)
J(t, x, u). (OPT)
Note that the optimization problem is well-defined and the value function satisfies v(t, x) < ∞ for t < T
(consider, e.g., constant liquidation exclusively in the primary exchange). Because of the liquidation constraint
(cf. Definition 2.3 (iv)), we expect the value function to fulfill
lim
s→T−
v(s, x) =
{
0 if x = 0
∞ else,
10Both mean and variance of execution costs are often used as measures of execution quality. The cost functional J is inspired
by such mean variance measures. An alternative approach is the maximization of expected utility: J˜(t, x, u) = E[U(φ(t, x, u))] for
some utility function U . In this alternative set-up analytical solutions are unfortunately not directly available through the methods
presented in this paper and are hence left for future research.
11The illustration and argument provided in Kratz and Schöneborn [2012] applies for the continuous-time case in the same way
as it applies to the discrete-time setting in which it is presented.
12An alternative interesting set-up is to consider trade execution under minimum proceeds constraints. Such problems have
recently been addressed using theory about stochastic target problems (see, e.g., Bouchard et al. [2009] and Bouchard and Dang
[2012]).
7
i.e., v has a singularity at the terminal time T . Because of this singularity, non-standard considerations are
necessary for solving the Optimization Problem (OPT) via a verification argument using the HJB equation.
As an intermediate step, we hence weaken the liquidation constraint by allowing for all strategies u ∈ A˜(t)
and by penalizing non-liquidation by finite end-costs. More precisely, for l > 0 and u = (ξ, η) ∈ A˜(t), we define
the following cost functional
J˜(l, t, x, u) := E
[ ∫ T
t
f(ξ(s), Xu(s))ds+ l ·Xu(T )>IXu(T )
]
.
The resulting optimization problem is
v˜(l, t, x) := inf
u∈A˜(t)
J˜(l, t, x, u). (O˜PT)
The Optimization Problem (O˜PT) mainly serves as an approximation of the optimization Problem (OPT).
However, it is also of interest itself: the penalization term l ·Xu(T )>IXu(T ) can be considered as the liquidation
cost of the left-over position. Note that the identity matrix in the term can be replaced by any positive definite
matrix reflecting this interpretation (e.g., Λ) without changing any of the proofs significantly.
In the following, we solve the unconstrained Optimization Problem (O˜PT) first (Section 3.2). Then, we
show that the solution of the Optimization Problem (O˜PT) converges to the solution of the original constrained
Optimization Problem (OPT) as l→∞ (Section 3.3).
2.5 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
In this section we derive a candidate for the value function of the Optimization Problem (O˜PT). Heuristic
considerations suggest that it should satisfy the following HJB equation (see, e.g., Øksendal and Sulem [2007]):
∂w
∂t
(t, x) = sup
u=(ξ,η)∈Rn×Rn
[ n∑
i=1
θi
(
w(t, x)− w(t, x− η>ei)
)
+∇xw(t, x)ξ−f(ξ, x)
]
w(T, x) = lx>x.
(H˜JB)
The linear-quadratic form of the cost functional suggests that the value function is quadratic. Assuming that
the above guesses are correct, the following proposition provides candidates both for the value function and for
the optimal strategy.
Proposition 2.5. Let l > 0 and assume that the initial value problem for a matrix differential equation
C ′ = C>Λ−1C + C>C˜C − αΣ, C(T ) = lI,
where C˜(l, t) := diag
(
θi
ci,i(l,t)
)
possesses a positive definite solution C(l, t) = (ci,j(l, t))i,j=1,...,n on [0, T ]. Then
w(l, t, x) := x>C(l, t)x
satisfies the HJB Equation (H˜JB) with maximizer u∗ = (ξ∗, η∗) for
ξ∗ := ξ∗(l, t, x) := Λ−1C(l, t)x, η∗ := η∗(l, t, x) := C¯(l, t)C(l, t)x,
where C¯(l, t) := diag
(
1
ci,i(l,t)
)
.
If there exist i1, . . . , ik ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that θij = 0 (j = 1, . . . , k), then ηij can be chosen arbitrarily. Up
to arbitrary choices of ηij , the maximizer is unique.
Proof. The assertion follows directly from plugging the quadratic ansatz w(l, t, x) = x>C(l, t)x into the HJB
Equation (H˜JB); the resulting function can be maximized by standard calculus.
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3 Main results
Proposition 2.5 suggests that the solution of the Optimization Problem (O˜PT) solves the initial value problem
for the matrix differential equation
C ′ = C>Λ−1C + C>C˜C − αΣ
C(T ) = lI,
(3)
where
C˜ := diag
( θi
ci,i
)
. (4)
In the remainder of the section, we state the main results of the article. In Section 3.1, we show that (3) admits
a unique solution C on [0, T ] and establish appropriate upper and lower bounds for C. Subsequently, we deduce
the solution of the Optimization Problem (O˜PT) in Section 3.2 and as a limit of this (as l → ∞) the solution
of the Optimization Problem (OPT) in Section 3.3. Proofs of these results are presented in Section 5.
Before we proceed, we introduce the following notations.
Notation 3.1. (i) For symmetric matrices A and B we say A > B (A ≥ B) if A−B is positive (nonnegative)
definite.
(ii) We denote the smallest and the largest eigenvalues of a real-symmetric matrix A by amin and amax,
respectively.
(iii) We define the following nonnegative definite matrix: D :=
√
Λ−1Σ
√
Λ−1.
3.1 Solution of the Initial Value Problem (3)
It is not immediately clear that the Initial Value Problem (3) possesses a positive definite solution on the whole
interval [0, T ] for n ≥ 2. For n = 1, it reduces to C ′ = C2Λ + θ1C − αΣ, C(T ) = l. This is an initial value
problem for a scalar Riccati differential equation with constant coefficients, whose unique solution is explicitly
known and exists on the whole interval [0, T ] (cf. Section 4.1). For n ≥ 2, the following theorem establishes the
existence and uniqueness of the solution of (3).
Theorem 3.2. Let θi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , n, θ =
n∑
i=1
θi and l > l0, where
l0 := max
{
λmax
(√
θ2
4 + αdmin − θ2
)
, λmin
(√
αdmax
)}
(5)
(cf. Notation 3.1). Then the Initial Value Problem (3) possesses a unique solution C(l, ·) on (−∞, T ]. The
solution is symmetric for all t ∈ (−∞, T ] and
0 < P (l, t) ≤
√
Λ−1C(l, t)
√
Λ−1 ≤ Q(l, t),
where P and Q are the solutions of the initial value problems
P ′ = P 2 + θP − αdminI, P (T ) = l
λmax
I and Q′ = Q2 − αdmaxI, Q(T ) = l
λmin
I, (6)
respectively.
Remark 3.3. (i) The solutions of the initial value problems for Riccati matrix differential equations in (6)
exist on the whole interval [0, T ] and can be computed in closed form (cf. Equations (21) - (24)). For
technical reasons, we prefer to establish bounds for
√
Λ−1C
√
Λ−1 instead of bounds for C. P and Q are
constructed in terms of multiples of the identity matrix and hence commute with all matrices. Therefore,
they transfer to bounds of C directly by multiplying them with Λ.
(ii) The bounds of C are an essential component for the proof of Theorem 3.2. Additionally, they are required
for all key steps of the solution of the Optimization Problem (O˜PT) (Proposition 3.4 and Theorem 3.5)
and of the solution of the Optimization Problem (OPT) (Theorem 3.6, Theorem 3.8 and Theorem 3.9).
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3.2 Solution of the Optimization Problem (O˜PT)
Combining Proposition 2.5 and Theorem 3.2, we obtain well-defined candidates both for the value function
(x>C(l, t)x) and for the optimal strategy u∗ = (ξ∗, η∗) of the Optimization Problem (O˜PT). The latter is given
by
ξ∗(l) := ξ∗(l, t, x) := Λ−1C(l, t)x, (7)
η∗(l) := η∗(l, t, x) := I˜C¯(l, t)C(l, t)x, (8)
where I˜ = (ei,j)i,j=1,...,n is the diagonal matrix with
ei,i =
{
1 if θi > 0
0 else
and C¯(l, t) := diag
( 1
ci,i(l, t)
)
.
The following Proposition confirms that u∗ is admissible.
Proposition 3.4. Let l > l0 for l0 as in Equation (5) and (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×Rn. Then u∗(l) = (ξ∗(l), η∗(l)) ∈ A˜(t),
where ξ∗(l) and η∗(l) are as in Equations (7) and (8), respectively.
Finally, we obtain the solution of the Optimization Problem (O˜PT).
Theorem 3.5. Let l ≥ l0 for l0 as in Equation (5) and let C(l, t) be the unique solution of the Initial Value
Problem (3). Then the value function of the Optimization Problem (O˜PT) is given by
v˜(l, t, x) = x>C(l, t)x
and the P⊗ λ - almost surely unique optimal strategy is given by u∗(l) as in Equations (7) and (8).
3.3 Solution of the Optimization Problem (OPT)
Intuitively, infinite end-costs should force the controlled process Xu(s) to approach zero as s→ T−; furthermore
the solution of the Optimization Problem (OPT) should be the limit of the solution of the Optimization
Problem (O˜PT) as l→∞. The following theorem confirms (in particular) that this limit is well-defined.
Theorem 3.6. Let t ∈ [0, T ).
(i) The element-wise limit of the value function matrix
C(t) := lim
l→∞
C(l, t)
exists on [0, T ), and C(l, ·) converges compactly to C on [0, T ). Furthermore, liml→∞ cmin(l, T ) =∞.
(ii) C solves the matrix differential equation
C ′ = C>Λ−1C + C>C˜C − αΣ (9)
on [0, T ) with boundary condition lims→T− cmin(s) =∞. Moreover, the following inequalities hold.
0 < P (t) ≤
√
Λ−1C(t)
√
Λ−1 ≤ Q(t), (10)
where P (t) := liml→∞ P (l, t) and Q(t) := liml→∞Q(l, t).
Remark 3.7. For Riccati matrix differential equations, there exists a unique solution F with lims→T− fmin(s) =
∞. This solution is called the principal solution (see, e.g., Coppel [1971]). In this spirit, C is the principal
solution of the Matrix Differential Equation (9). Note however that it is not entirely clear that C is the only
solution of (9) satisfying lims→T− cmin(s) =∞ since (9) is not a Riccati matrix differential equation.
By Theorem 3.6, we also obtain the existence of the limits of the optimal strategy:
ξ∗ := ξ∗(t, x) := lim
l→∞
ξ∗(l, t, x) = Λ−1C(t)x, η∗ := η∗(t, x) := lim
l→∞
η∗(l, t, x) = I˜C¯(t)C(t)x. (11)
It turns out that u∗ := (ξ∗, η∗) is an admissible liquidation strategy, in particular that it satisfies the liquidation
constraint
lim
s→T−
X∗(s) = 0 for X∗(s) := Xu
∗
(s).
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Theorem 3.8. Let t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ Rn and u∗ = (ξ∗, η∗) for ξ∗ and η∗ as in (11). Then u∗ ∈ A(t, x).
We are now ready to present the main result of this article: the solution of the Optimization Problem (OPT).
Theorem 3.9. The value function of the Optimization Problem (OPT) is given by
v(t, x) = x>C(t)x
for all t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ Rn and
lim
s→T−
v(s, x) =
{
0 if x = 0
∞ else.
The P⊗ λ - almost surely unique optimal strategy is given by u∗ = (ξ∗, η∗) as in (11) .
4 Properties of the value function and the optimal strategy
The characterization of the solution of the Optimization Problem (OPT) enables us to analyze the properties
of the optimal strategy and the value function in detail.13 For single asset liquidation (n = 1) the Initial Value
Problem (3) can be solved in closed form as the differential equation is a scalar Riccati equation with constant
coefficients. This allows us to prove monotonicity properties of the value function and the optimal strategy in
Section 4.1. In Section 4.2 we discuss the multi asset case by analyzing a portfolio of two assets. Although a
closed form solution of the Initial Value Problem (3) is not known in general for n ≥ 2, it is possible to derive
analytical results about the dependence of the value function and the optimal strategy on the model parameters,
in particular on the correlation of the assets. We illustrate that overly simple adjustments of existing trading
algorithms for optimal liquidation without dark pools can have undesirable properties. The proofs of the results
of this section are presented in Section 6.
4.1 Single asset liquidation
We let n = 1 and set θ = θ1. The solution of the Initial Value Problem (3) is given by
C(l, t) =
Λθ˜
2
coth
( θ˜
2
(T − t) + κ(l)
)
− Λθ
2
,
where
κ(l) := arcoth
( 2l
Λ + θ
θ˜
)
, θ˜ :=
√
θ2 + 4αΣΛ
for θ > 0 or αΣ > 0 and C(l, t) = Λ
T−t+ Λl
for θ = αΣ = 0. In order to highlight the dependence of the value
function on the parameters θ, Λ and αΣ, we define, e.g.,
C(t; θ) := C(t) = lim
l→∞
C(l, t) =
{
Λθ˜
2 coth
(
θ˜
2 (T − t)
)
− Λθ2 if θ > 0 or αΣ > 0
Λ
T−t if θ = αΣ = 0,
in particular
C(t; 0) =

√
αΣΛ coth
(√
αΣ
Λ (T − t)
)
if αΣ > 0
Λ
T−t if αΣ = 0.
We will apply similar notations throughout Section 4 to make the dependence of other model components (such
as the optimal strategy) on the respective parameters explicit whenever this clarifies the exposition. For θ = 0,
we obtain the special case of optimal liquidation without dark pool, see Almgren and Chriss [2001] for the
discrete-time case and Schied et al. [2010] for the continuous-time version.
No transaction costs must be paid in the dark pool; intuitively, the investor should hence try to liquidate as
much as possible in the dark pool. Indeed, we have
η∗(t, x; θ) = C¯(t; θ)C(t; θ)x = x
13We limit the analysis to the Optimization Problem (OPT). Most of the properties transfer directly to the Optimization
Problem (O˜PT) with the same or similar proofs.
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for θ > 0 by Theorem 3.9, i.e., it is optimal to always place the full remaining asset position in the dark pool;14
note that the execution of the dark pool order immediately stops the trading activity by linearity of the optimal
strategy in the position.
In Section 4.1.1, we discuss the dependence of the optimal strategy and the value function on θ. Subsequently,
we analyze the dependence on the price impact Λ and the risk parameter αΣ in Section 4.1.2.
4.1.1 Dependence on θ
We expect it to be optimal to slow down trading in the primary venue initially as the trader hopes to trade
cheaper in the dark pool. This intuition is confirmed by Proposition 4.1 (ii) and (iii) below. In order to state the
property rigorously, we first denote the optimal trading trajectory until execution in the dark pool by X˜(·; θ),
i.e., X˜ is the solution of the linear initial value problem X ′ = −ξ∗(·, X; θ), X(0) = x, where x is the initial asset
position at time zero. Then for t ∈ [0, T ),
X˜(t; θ) = x exp
(
−
∫ t
0
C(s; θ)
Λ
ds
)
=
sinh
(
θ˜
2 (T − t)
)
exp
(
θ
2 t
)
sinh
(
θ˜
2T
) x. (12)
We obtain the following monotonicity properties. For simplicity of exposition we assume αΣ > 0. Similar
results hold for the simpler case αΣ = 0 (cf. also the right hand graph of Figure 1).
Proposition 4.1. (i) For t ∈ [0, T ), C(t; θ) is strictly decreasing in θ.
(ii) For x > 0 and t ∈ (0, T ], ξ∗(t, x; θ) is strictly decreasing in θ.
(iii) For x > 0 and t ∈ (0, T ), X˜(t; θ) is strictly increasing in θ.
(iv) For x > 0 and t ∈ (0, T ), the expected asset position if the optimal strategy is applied, E[X∗(t; θ)], is
strictly decreasing in θ.
(v) For αΣ > 0, the risk costs αΣ · E[ ∫ T
0
X∗(t; θ)2dt
]
are strictly decreasing in θ.
(vi) The impact costs Λ · E[ ∫ T
0
ξ∗(t,X∗(t; θ); θ)2dt
]
are strictly decreasing in θ.
Let us shortly comment on Proposition 4.1. The fact that the overall costs are decreasing in θ (part (i)) is
quite intuitive and can be deduced directly from the definition of the cost functional J . Proposition 4.1 (iv)
states that the introduction of a dark pool decreases the expected asset position despite slower initial trading in
the primary exchange (parts (ii) and (iii)). Parts (v) and (vi) of Proposition 4.1 confirm that the introduction of
the dark pool decreases both the impact costs component and the risk costs component of the value function.15
We illustrate these properties in Figure 1. In the left picture we consider a risk neutral investor and in the
right picture a risk averse investor. The optimal trading trajectories for trading with dark pool are displayed
by the thick solid lines. In the displayed scenario the dark pool order is executed at time τ . After execution in
the dark pool, the liquidation task is finished. The dotted lines denote the scenario where the dark pool order
is not executed during the entire trading horizon and the thin solid lines refer to the expected asset positions.
We contrast the optimal strategy with dark pool by the optimal strategy without dark pool (dashed lines). As
shown in Proposition 4.1, the dark pool slows down trading in the primary venue initially. Nevertheless, the
expected position is smaller than the trading trajectory without dark pool.
4.1.2 Dependence on Λ and αΣ
It follows directly from the definition of the cost functional J that the value function is strictly increasing both
in the impact costs parameter Λ and in the risk costs parameter αΣ. For the optimal strategy, impact costs
and risk costs have conflicting influences: while larger impact costs yield a reduction of the trading intensity,
larger risk costs yield faster trading (cf. also the difference of the left and the right picture of Figure 1). We
summarize these findings in the following proposition.
14We want to remark that this property is sensitive to the assumption that P˜ is a martingale (Assumption 2.1 (i)). If, e.g., the
investor holds a long position in the asset and P˜ has a positive drift, she should be reluctant to sell her entire position too early.
Therefore, we expect that a drift changes this property. Similarly, if adverse selection is included into the model, the property
η∗(t, x) = x does not hold; this was shown by Kratz [2012].
15It is an interesting effect that this is not necessarily the case in the discrete-time setting of Kratz and Schöneborn [2012] where
the risk costs can be increasing for small θ. This effect is lost by letting the length of the trading periods tend to zero (see Kratz
[2011]).
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Figure 1: Optimal trading trajectories for a risk neutral (left picture) respectively a risk averse trader (right
picture). The thick solid lines denote the optimal trading trajectory with dark pool in the scenario where the
dark pool order is executed at time τ . The dotted lines denote the scenario where the dark pool order is not
executed during the entire trading horizon and the thin solid lines refer to the expected asset positions. The
dashed lines denote optimal liquidation without dark pools. x = 1, T = 1, Λ = 1, θ = 4 and for the right
picture α = 6, Σ = 1.
Proposition 4.2. (i) For t ∈ [0, T ), C(t; Λ, αΣ) is strictly increasing in Λ and in αΣ.
(ii) Let t ∈ [0, T ) and x > 0 be fixed. Then ξ∗(t, x; Λ) is strictly decreasing in Λ. Consequently, X˜(t; Λ) is
strictly increasing in Λ for t ∈ (0, T ).
(iii) Let t ∈ [0, T ) and x > 0 be fixed. Then ξ∗(t, x;αΣ) is strictly increasing in αΣ. Consequently, X˜(t;αΣ)
is strictly decreasing in αΣ for t ∈ (0, T ).
4.2 Portfolio liquidation
If a risk averse investor has to liquidate a portfolio of multiple assets (n ≥ 2), then correlation between the assets
comes into play. Depending on whether the portfolio is well (poorly) balanced, it is intuitively optimal to place
orders in the dark pool which are smaller (larger) than the remaining portfolio position. In the first case, the
risk costs of the portfolio are small and therefore, the trader will not risk to lose her balanced position by the full
execution of her dark pool order for only one of the assets; hence her orders are smaller than the remainder of
the position. In the second case, it might be optimal to place orders in the dark pool which are larger than the
remainder of the position for risk mitigation reasons. This illustration suggests that overly simple adjustments
of existing trading algorithms for optimal liquidation without dark pools can have undesirable results.
In Section 4.2.1, we verify the above intuition by analytical results about the dependence of the value function
and the optimal strategy on the correlation of a portfolio of two assets; we then deduce the general structure
of the optimal strategy dependent on whether the portfolio is well or poorly balanced. We also discuss the
dependence of the value function and the optimal strategy on the price impact parameter and the execution
intensities in Section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, respectively.
As a prerequisite, we introduce a characterization of the optimal dark pool order which exploits that the
jump times of the Poisson processes are almost surely distinct. Intuitively, an execution of the optimal dark
pool order for asset i should bring the position in asset i to its optimal value given unchanged positions in all
other assets j 6= i. The following Proposition confirms this intuition (see also Naujokat and Westray [2011] for
a similar result).
Proposition 4.3. Let t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rn be the portfolio position at time t and i = 1, . . . , n. Then,
v(t, x− η∗i (t, x)ei) = min
η∈R
v(t, x− ηei).
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4.2.1 Dependence on correlation
We will see that dark pool trading is sensitive to the correlation of price increments. In the following, we discuss
the case n = 2.16 In order to simplify the exposition, we assume that there is no cross asset price impact:17
Λ =
(
λ1 0
0 λ2
)
, Σ =
(
σ21 ρσ1σ2
ρσ1σ2 σ
2
2
)
. (13)
For the purposes of this section, we assume that the variances σ1 and σ2 of the two assets as well as the risk
aversion parameter α are strictly positive.
If the correlation of the two assets is positive (ρ > 0), a portfolio consisting of a long position in one asset
and a short position in the other asset is more desirable than long positions (or short positions) in both assets;
in the former case, a part of the risk of each asset is hedged by the other asset. Conversely, if ρ < 0, it is more
desirable to have long (or short) positions in both assets.
Definition 4.4. A portfolio x = (x1, x2)> (x1, x2 6= 0) is well diversified if either the signs of the positions are
equal (sgn(x1) = sgn(x2)) and ρ < 0 or if the signs of the positions are different and ρ > 0. Otherwise, the
portfolio is poorly diversified.
Proposition 4.5. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and x1, x2 6= 0. Then v(t, (x1, x2)>) < v(t, (x1,−x2)>) if and only if the
portfolio x is well diversified; v(t, (x1, x2)>) > v(t, (x1,−x2)>) if and only if the portfolio x is poorly diversified.
We can further specify the dependence of the value function on the correlation if the portfolio is well
diversified.
Proposition 4.6. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and x be well diversified. Then v(t, x) is strictly decreasing in |ρ|.
The left picture of Figure 2 illustrates the dependence of the value function on the correlation ρ for a portfolio
that is long in both assets. For ρ < 0, this portfolio is well diversified and the value function is increasing in
ρ (i.e., decreasing in |ρ|) in line with Proposition 4.6. For ρ > 0, the portfolio is poorly diversified. This leads
to elevated liquidation costs for small positive ρ. For large positive ρ, the increased risk costs of the current
portfolio are outweighed by the (projected) smaller risk costs of a future well diversified portfolio (e.g., after the
execution of an order in the dark pool; cf. also Proposition 4.8 (ii) below). The opportunity of risk reduction
results in a decrease of the value function for large values of ρ in the displayed example.
-1
4.32
4.19
2.44 ρ
v(0, x)
1 -1
1.20
1.08
0.79 ρ
ξ∗2 (0, x)
1 -1
1.16
1
0.84 ρ
η∗2 (0, x)
1
Figure 2: Dependence of the value function (left picture), the optimal trading intensity for the second asset
(middle picture) and the optimal dark pool order for the second asset (right picture) on the correlation ρ.
x1 = x2 = 1, T = 1, λ1 = 3, λ2 = 0.2, θ1 = 0.5, θ2 = 5, α = 4 and σ1 = σ2 = 1.
We have the following symmetry and monotonicity properties for the entries of the value function matrix C.
Proposition 4.7. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and denote the entries of the value function matrix by ci,j(t; ρ), i, j = 1, 2.
(i) c1,1(t; ρ), c2,2(t; ρ) > 0 and c1,1(t; ρ) = c1,1(t;−ρ), c2,2(t; ρ) = c2,2(t;−ρ), sgn(c1,2(t; ρ)) = sgn(ρ) and
c1,2(t; ρ) = −c1,2(t;−ρ).
16If n > 2, the situation is more complicated: positive correlation is not transitive in general. Hence, we cannot use Definition 4.4
below for the characterization of well versus poorly diversified portfolios. If the correlations of the price processes satisfy transitivity,
some of the results can be generalized.
17Cross price impact and correlation can have conflicting influences on the value function and the optimal strategy. We discuss
cross asset impact at the end of Section 4.2.2.
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(ii) c1,1(t; ρ) and c2,2(t; ρ) are strictly increasing in ρ on [−1, 0) and strictly decreasing in ρ on (0, 1]. c1,2(t; ρ)
is increasing in ρ on [−1, 1].
The risk mitigation opportunity created by a strong correlation of the price increments becomes apparent
again in Proposition 4.7. Liquidating a single asset position x = (x1, 0)> results in the cost v(t, (x, 0)) =
c1,1(t; ρ)x
2
1, which exhibits a strict local maximum at ρ = 0 and decreases as the correlation between the two
assets becomes stronger (irrespective of the sign of the correlation). This implies in particular that it is optimal
for the investor to trade in both assets (unless ρ = 0) even if the current position in one asset is zero.
Proposition 4.5 suggests that an optimal liquidation strategy never changes the sign of the asset positions of
a well diversified portfolio and always seeks to turn a poorly diversified portfolio into a well diversified portfolio.
The following proposition confirms this conjecture.
Proposition 4.8. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ R2 be the portfolio position at time t.
(i) If x is well diversified, then X∗(s) is well diversified for all s ∈ [t, T ) with sgn(X∗i (s)) = sgn(xi) for
i = 1, 2.
(ii) If x is poorly diversified, then sgn(X∗i (s−)− η∗i (s,X∗(s−))) 6= sgn(xi) for s ∈ [t, τ), where
τ = inf{s ≥ t| sgn(X∗i (s)) 6= sgn(xi) or X∗i (s) = 0 for some i = 1, 2} ∧ T > t a.s.
By Proposition 4.8, the investor trades in both assets during the entire trading horizon [0, T ] if the portfolio
is well diversified. If the portfolio is poorly diversified the execution of the dark pool order in one of the assets
always changes the sign of the position. If dark pool orders are never executed, it can be optimal to decrease
the risk costs by changing the sign of the position in one of the assets by only trading at the exchange (as it is
the case in the numerical example underlying the left picture of Figure 3); in general, this is not the case.18
In the following, we specify the dependence of the optimal strategy on ρ. By Theorem 3.9, we have
ξ∗1(t, x) =
1
λ1
(
c1,1(t; ρ)x1 + c1,2(t; ρ)x2
)
, ξ∗2(t, x) =
1
λ2
(
c2,2(t; ρ)x2 + c1,2(t; ρ)x2
)
, (14)
η∗1(t, x) = x1 +
c1,2(t; ρ)
c1,1(t; ρ)
x2, η
∗
2(t, x) = x2 +
c1,2(t; ρ)
c2,2(t; ρ)
x1. (15)
Proposition 4.9. Let t ∈ [0, T ), x = (x1, x2)>, x1, x2 > 0 and i = 1, 2.
(i) ηi(t, x) is strictly increasing in ρ for ρ ∈ [−1, 1].
(ii) ξi(t, x) is strictly increasing in ρ for ρ ∈ [−1, 0).
Analog results hold for x1, x2 < 0 and sgn(x1) 6= sgn(x2).
For a well diversified portfolio, the profit from diversification is increasing in |ρ| (cf. Proposition 4.6). There-
fore, the investor decreases her trading activity both at the exchange and in the dark pool for larger ρ. For a
poorly diversified portfolio, this is not necessarily the case (cf. the left picture of Figure 2 and the corresponding
discussion); in contrast to the optimal dark pool orders, the trader might decrease her trading intensity for large
positive ρ in order to save price impact costs while waiting for the execution of an order in the dark pool (which
yields a well diversified position by Proposition 4.8 (ii) below). We illustrate the dependence of u∗ on ρ in the
middle and the right picture of Figure 2. In the displayed case, the trading intensity of the second asset is not
increasing in ρ if x is poorly diversified (i.e., ρ > 0). On the other hand, the optimal dark pool order is strictly
increasing for ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. The symmetry of the graph in the right picture follows directly from the symmetries
of c1,2 and c2,2. If ρ = 0, the optimal strategies for the two assets are independent and follow from the formulae
of Section 4.1; in particular, the optimal dark pool order equals x2 = 1.
We deduce the general structure of the optimal strategy for initial positions x1, x2 > 0 from the above
results. If x is poorly diversified (ρ > 0), we have ξi(t, x), ηi(t, x) > 0 by Equations (14) and (15); hence it is
optimal to decrease the position. This is not necessarily the case for a well diversified portfolio (ρ < 0); in this
case both ξi(t, x) and ηi(t, x) can be negative as c1,2(t; ρ) < 0 (cf. also the middle picture of Figure 4 below).
18Consider, e.g., a portfolio where x1 = x2, λ1 = λ2, σ1 = σ2 and θ1 = θ2. Then the optimal trading intensities for the two
assets must be equal until a dark pool order is executed. In particular, if the orders in the dark pool are never executed, both
position must become zero at the same time after which further trading is not optimal.
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Figure 3: Evolution of a portfolio consisting of two highly correlated stocks over time. The left picture illustrates
a poorly diversified portfolio, the right picture a well diversified portfolio. In both pictures, thin lines are used
for the less liquid first stock and thick lines for the more liquid second stock. Dashed lines correspond to trading
without the dark pool and solid lines correspond to a realization of the liquidation process using the dark pool,
where dark pool orders for the second stock are executed at times τ1 and τ2 and for the first stock at time
τ3. Dotted lines correspond to the position which the investor aims to reach by her dark pool order for the
respective stock. x1 = 1, x2 = 1 (left picture), x2 = −1 (right picture), T = 1, θ1 = 0.5, θ2 = 3, λ1 = 3,
λ2 = 0.2, α = 4, σ1 = σ2 = 1 and ρ = 0.9.
For the first asset, this is the case if and only if x1 < − c1,2(t;ρ)c1,1(t;ρ)x2. It can hence be optimal to increase the
position in order to further reduce the risk costs of the portfolio. Note that as sgn(ξi(t, x)) = sgn(ηi(t, x)) the
direction of trading in the dark pool and at the primary exchange is always the same. Furthermore, it can be
optimal to neither trade at the exchange nor in the dark pool (in the first asset) at time t if x1 = − c1,2(t;ρ)c1,1(t;ρ)x2.
As the execution of an order in the dark pool balances the trade-off of price impact costs against risk costs,
it should intuitively never be optimal to increase a positive position or to decrease a negative position once the
dark pool order of one of the assets has been executed. The following proposition confirms this conjecture.
Proposition 4.10. Let t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ R2 be the portfolio position at time t and τ1 be the first jump time of pi.
Then for all s ≥ τ1, i = 1, 2,
sgn(ξi(s,X
∗(s−))) = sgn(ηi(s,X∗(s−))) = sgn(X∗i (s−)) or ξi(s,X∗(s−)) = ηi(s,X∗(s−)) = 0.
We close the section by illustrating the structure of the optimal strategy and its dependence on ρ by a
numerical example. To this end, we consider two strongly positively correlated assets with λ1 = 3, λ2 = 0.2,
i.e., the second asset is more liquid than the first asset. We also model the dark pool in such a way that the
execution of orders for the second asset is more probable than for the first asset: θ1 = 0.5, θ2 = 3.19 We consider
a poorly diversified portfolio x = (1, 1)> and a well diversified portfolio x = (1,−1)> of the two stocks.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the two portfolios if a risk averse investor applies the optimal strategy. The
left picture corresponds to the poorly diversified portfolio, the right one to the well diversified portfolio. In both
cases, thin lines are used for the first stock and thick lines for the second. Dashed lines correspond to trading
without the dark pool and the solid lines correspond to a realization of the liquidation process using the dark
pool, where the dark pool orders for the second stock are executed at times τ1 and τ2 and for the first stock
only at time τ3, i.e., dark pool orders for the more liquid stock are executed twice before any execution in the
less liquid stock takes place. Dotted lines correspond to the position which the investor aims to reach by her
dark pool order for the respective stock (cf. Proposition 4.3).
For the poorly diversified portfolio, the trader tries to improve her risky position by trading out of the
second stock (cf. Proposition 4.8 (ii) and the subsequent discussion). For this stock, trading in the primary
venue is less expensive and being executed in the dark pool is more probable. For the well diversified portfolio,
the portfolio position is decreasing almost linearly in time in all cases. Additionally, orders in the dark pool
are very large for the poorly diversified portfolio and comparatively small for the well diversified portfolio, in
line with Proposition 4.8. The reason is that dark pool orders are such that either the risk costs are decreased
significantly by an execution (in the poorly diversified case) or they are only slightly increased (in the well
diversified case). Note that both for the poorly and for the well diversified portfolio, these effects are stronger
for the liquid stock; for the illiquid stock, savings in price impact costs outweigh savings in risk costs.
19Our choice of the parameters reflects the intuition that the asset which is more liquid at the exchange (smaller λ) is also more
liquid in the dark pool (larger θ). Theoretical findings of Ye [2011] support this choice. However, we are not aware of any empirical
evidence for this; in some cases, the opposite parameter choice can also be plausible.
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4.2.2 Dependence on price impact
In this section, we discuss the dependence of the value function and the optimal strategy on the price impact
and on the cross price impact. It follows directly from the definition of the cost functional J that the value
function is increasing in the price impact matrix Λ. On the other hand, the increase of v is in some sense
bounded by the increase of Λ.
Proposition 4.11. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ Rn.
(i) v(t, x) is increasing in Λ.
(ii) Let Λ = diag(λj , ; j = 1, . . . , n). For i = 1, . . . , n,
v(t,x;λi)
λi
is decreasing in λi.
The optimal trading strategy does not need to be monotone in the price impact parameter since risk miti-
gation and liquidation can be conflicting desires. We illustrate this situation in Figure 4 by considering three
different well diversified portfolios. In the first case (x1 = 0.7, x2 = −0.7; left picture) further risk mitigation
is not optimal; the trading intensity is decreasing in the price impact. In the second case (x1 = 0.7, x2 = −1.1;
middle picture) it is profitable to increase the position for small price impact in order to reach a position with
even less risk costs; the optimal trading intensity is increasing and further risk mitigation is only profitable for
small enough λ1. In the third case (x1 = 0.7, x2 = −0.81; right picture) the optimal intensity is increasing
for very small λ1 and then decreasing; the conflict apparent in the left and the middle picture destroys the
monotonicity in this case.
2.94
0.68
0.005
λ1
ξ∗1 (0, x)
0.5
0.32
−4.10
0.005 λ1
ξ∗1 (0, x)
0.5
0.55
0.36
0.005
λ1
ξ∗1 (0, x)
0.5
Figure 4: Dependence of the optimal trading intensity for the first asset on λ1 ∈ (0.005, 0.5) for a well diversified
portfolio x with x1 = 0.7, and different positions in the second asset: x2 = −0.7 (left picture), x2 = −1 (middle
picture) and x2 = −0.81 (right picture). T = 1, λ2 = 1, θ1 = θ2 = 1, α = 4, σ1 = σ2 = 1 and ρ = 0.9.
We close the section by analyzing the cross asset price impact λ1,2 in the price impact matrix
Λ =
(
λ1 λ1,2
λ1,2 λ2
)
for 0 < |λ1,2| <
√
λ1λ2.
We first consider the case sgn(λ1,2) = sgn(ρ).20 We obtain the following analogs of Propositions 4.5 and 4.8 (ii).
Proposition 4.12. Let t ∈ [0, T ), sgn(λ1,2) = sgn(ρ) and x1, x2 6= 0.
(i) v(t, (x1, x2)>) < v(t, (x1,−x2)>) if and only if the portfolio x is well diversified;21
v(t, (x1, x
>
2 )) > v(t, (x1,−x2)>) if and only if the portfolio x is poorly diversified.
(ii) If x is poorly diversified, then sgn(X∗i (s−)− η∗i (s,X∗(s−))) 6= sgn(xi) for s ∈ [t, τ), where
τ = inf{s ≥ t| sgn(X∗i (s)) 6= sgn(xi) or X∗i (s) = 0 for some i = 1, 2} ∧ T > t a.s.
(iii) If x is well diversified, then sgn(X∗i (s−)− η∗i (s,X∗(s−))) = sgn(xi) for s ∈ [t, τ), where τ is as above.
20This case is more intuitive than the converse: if the assets are positively correlated, buying in the first asset should rather
increase than decrease the price of the second asset.
21Similarly as before (cf. Definition 4.4), we call a portfolio x = (x1, x2)> (x1, x2 6= 0) well diversified if either the signs of the
positions are equal (sgn(x1) = sgn(x2)) and ρ, λ1,2 < 0 or if the signs of the positions are different and ρ, λ1,2 > 0. Otherwise, the
portfolio is poorly diversified.
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For well diversified portfolios, we can recover only a part of Proposition 4.8 (i): by (iii), it is not optimal to
change the sign of the position by placing oversized orders in the dark pool. However, it can be optimal to turn
a well diversified portfolio into a poorly diversified portfolio by trading in the primary exchange. We illustrate
this in the left picture of Figure 5; in the displayed scenario, the trader holds a positive position in the second
asset only. The trading intensity of the first asset is denoted by the solid line. If λ1,2 = 0 it is optimal to sell
stocks in the first asset which is positively correlated to the second asset (cf. the results of Section 4.2.1, in
particular the discussion following Proposition 4.7). If λ1,2 increases, it becomes profitable to buy stocks in the
first asset: as the cross price impact is positive, this allows the trader to increase her trading intensity in the
second asset (dashed line) without increasing the overall impact costs too much. In parallel, the trader places
a sell order for the first asset in the dark pool as she does not want to sell the stocks at the exchange again
(which would result in additional price impact costs due to the sign of λ1,2).
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ξ∗i (0, x)
0
1.02
x1=1
0.93
0−0.7
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η∗1 (0, x)
0.09
−0.05
−0.07
0 10
0.56
0.01
θ1
ξ∗1 (0, x) ξ
∗
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Figure 5: The left picture illustrates the dependence of the optimal trading intensity on λ1,2 ∈ (0, 0.7) for a
portfolio with x1 = 0, x2 = 1. The solid line refers to the first asset, the dashed line to the second asset.
The middle picture illustrates the dependence of the optimal dark pool order on λ1,2 ∈ (−0.7, 0) for a portfolio
x1 = 1, x2 = −1. in both pictures, T = 1, λ1 = λ2 = α = σ1 = σ2 = 1, θ1 = θ2 = 3 and ρ = 0.2; in
particular, sgn(ρ) = sgn(λ1,2) for the left picture and sgn(ρ) 6= sgn(λ1,2) for the middle picture. The right
picture illustrates the dependence of the optimal trading intensity on θ1 ∈ (0, 10) for a well diversified portfolio
x (x1 = 0.25, x2 = −1, ρ = 0.9; solid line) and a poorly diversified portfolio x˜ (x˜1 = x1, x˜2 = 1; dashed line).
λ1,2 = 0; the remaining parameters are as above.
The case sgn(λ1,2) 6= sgn(ρ) (cf. Footnote 20) is more complicated. In this case, it can be optimal to change
the sign of a well diversified position (in the sense of Definition 4.4) by placing oversized orders in the dark pool;
for large cross price impact, the savings in impact costs resulting from the change of the position can outweigh
the increase risk costs. We illustrate this by a numerical example in the middle picture of Figure 5.
4.2.3 Dependence on the execution intensities
We conclude this section by analyzing the dependence of the value function and the optimal strategy on dark
pool liquidity (more precisely on the intensities of the Poisson process pi). Similarly as in the single asset case
(cf. Proposition 4.1 (i)), the costs are decreasing in the intensities θi.
Proposition 4.13. Let t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ Rn and i = 1, . . . , n. Then v(t, x; θi) is decreasing in θi.
The same trade-offs that can cause a non-monotone dependence of the optimal strategy on the price impact
parameters can also give rise to a non-monotone dependence on the dark pool liquidity parameters θi. We
illustrate the dependence of the optimal trading intensity on θ1 for a poorly (dashed line) and a well diversified
portfolio (solid line) in the right picture of Figure 5.
5 Proofs of the main results
5.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2
For n ≥ 2, the second summand in the matrix differential equation C>C˜C is in general not linear (or quadratic),
and (3) is not a Riccati matrix differential equation. Furthermore, a closed form solution for the corresponding
initial value problem is not known, and the existing theory about Riccati matrix differential equations is not
applicable directly.
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It turns out that appropriate upper and lower bounds for the non-linear term C>C˜C transform to lower
and upper bounds (P respectively Q) for the solution of the Matrix Initial Value Problem (3) and yield exis-
tence and positive definiteness of the solution on the whole interval (−∞, T ] (Theorem 3.2). To this end, we
require a version of a well-known comparison result for matrix Riccati differential equations, which we state in
Appendix A. The main step is thus to obtain adequate matrix inequalities which enable us to transfer these
results to the Initial Value Problem (3).
For C > 0, we have 0 ≤ CC˜C. The desired upper bound of CC˜C is a direct consequence of the matrix
inequality stated in the following result.
Proposition 5.1. Let C = (ci,j)i,j=1...,n ∈ Rn×n be a positive definite matrix and θi > 0, i = 1, . . . , n. Then
C ≤ θ diag
(ci,i
θi
)
= θC˜−1, (16)
where θ := θ(n) :=
∑n
i=1 θi.
Proof. We prove the inequality by induction on n. It is clear for n = 1 with equality in (16). Let now n ≥ 1
and C = (ci,j)i,j=1,...,n+1 ∈ R(n+1)×(n+1) be positive definite. Define Cn ∈ Rn×n and c ∈ Rn such that
C =
(
Cn c
c> cn+1,n+1
)
.
For z = (x, y)> ∈ Rn ×R, z 6= 0, we have
z>Cz = x>Cnx+ 2x>cy + cn+1,n+1y2, z> diag
(ci,i
θi
)
z = x> diag
(ci,i
θi
)
x+
cn+1,n+1
θn+1
y2.
By abuse of notation, diag
(
ci,i
θi
)
is used both for the diagonal n×n - matrix with c1,1θ1 , . . . ,
cn,n
θn
in the diagonal
and for the respective diagonal (n+1)×(n+1) - matrix. Which one we refer to is always clear from the context.
z>
(
θ(n+ 1) diag
(ci,i
θi
)
− C
)
z
= x>
(
θ(n) diag
(ci,i
θi
)
− Cn
)
x> + θn+1x> diag
(ci,i
θi
)
x− 2x>cy + θ(n)
θn+1
cn+1,n+1y
2. (17)
The first summand in Equation (17) is non-negative by the induction hypothesis. The remainder equals(
x− 1
θn+1
diag
( θi
ci,i
)
cy
)>
θn+1 diag
(ci,i
θi
)(
x− 1
θn+1
diag
( θi
ci,i
)
cy
)
+
(
cn+1,n+1
θ(n)
θn+1
− c>
diag
(
θi
ci,i
)
θn+1
c
)
y2,
where the first summand is nonnegative as Cn (and therefore diag
( ci,i
θi
)
) is positive definite and θn+1 > 0. We
have (see, e.g., the book by Horn and Johnson [1985], Corollary 7.7.422)
0 <
1
θ(n)
diag
( θi
ci,i
)
≤ C−1n (18)
by the induction hypothesis. Moreover
C
(
In×n −C−1n c
0 1
)
=
(
Cn 0
c> cn+1,n+1 − c>C−1n c
)
and hence
cn+1,n+1 − c>C−1n c =
detC
detCn
> 0. (19)
Finally,
cn+1,n+1 − 1
θ(n)
c> diag
( θi
ci,i
)
c
(18)
≥ cn+1,n+1 − c>C−1n c
(19)
> 0,
finishing the proof.
22For matrices A,B with 0 < A < B, we have 0 < B−1 < A−1.
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Applications of Horn and Johnson [1985], Corollary 7.7.4 (cf. Footnote 22 again), imply the desired bound
for CC˜C. Additionally, we obtain two elementary matrix inequalities.
Corollary 5.2. Let C > 0 and θi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n. Then
CC˜C ≤ θC, (20)
C ≤ n diag (ci,i) and C ≤ tr(C)I.
The Matrix Inequality (20) enables us to apply Theorem A.1 to the Matrix Initial Value Problem (3) such
that we can prove existence of a solution C of (3) on the whole interval (−∞, T ] and at the same time construct
upper and lower bounds for C via the solutions of the initial value problems in (6); these are given explicitly by
P (l, t) = p(l, t)I, Q(l, t) = q(l, t)I, (21)
where
p(l, t) :=
√
θ2
4 + αdmin coth
(√
θ2
4 + αdmin(T − t) + κ1(l)
)
− θ
2
, (22)
q(l, t) :=
√
αdmax coth
(√
αdmax(T − t) + κ2(l)
)
(23)
for θ + αdmin > 0 respectively αdmax > 0 with
κ1(l) := arcoth
( l
λmax
+ θ2√
θ2
4 + αdmin
)
> 0, κ2(l) := arcoth
( l
λmin√
αdmax
)
> 0
and
p(l, t) :=
1
T − t+ λmaxl
, q(l, t) :=
1
T − t+ λminl
(24)
for θ = αdmin = 0 respectively αdmax = 0. Note also that 0 < p(l, t), q(l, t) <∞ for all t ∈ (−∞, T ].
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let C(l, t) be a solution of (3) on some interval (t1, T ]; note that there exists a local
solution by the Picard-Lindelöf theorem. The symmetry of Λ, Σ and the initial value C(l, T ) = lI imply that
C(l, t) is symmetric on (t1, T ].
Let now Pˆ := ΛP for P as in (21). Then Pˆ (l, t) solves Pˆ ′ = PˆΛ−1Pˆ + θPˆ − αdminΛ, Pˆ (T ) = lλmax Λ on
(−∞, T ]. As P > 0 and P commute with Λ, we have Pˆ (l, t) > 0. Assume that
{t ∈ (t1, T ] |C(l, t) is not positive definite} 6= ∅ (25)
and define τ := sup{t ∈ (t1, T ] |C(l, t) is not positive definite}. As C(l, T ) = lI > 0 and C(l, ·) is continuous,
there exists an  > 0 such that C(l, t) > 0 for t ∈ (T − , T ] and thus τ < T . We apply Theorem A.1 to P¯ := −Pˆ
and C¯ := −C on [τ, T ]. We have
P¯ (l, T ) = − l
λmax
Λ ≥ −lI = C¯(l, T )
and
P¯ ′=−P¯Λ−1P¯ + θP¯ + αdminΛ, C¯ ′=−C¯Λ−1C¯ + C¯ ˜¯CC¯ + αΣ = −C¯Λ−1C¯ + θC¯ +
(
α
√
ΛD
√
Λ + C¯ ˜¯CC¯ − θC¯).
Let now x ∈ Rn. Applying Corollary 5.2 to −C¯, we obtain
x>
(
α
√
ΛD
√
Λ + C¯ ˜¯CC¯ − θC¯ − αdminΛ
)
x = αx>
(√
Λ(D − dminI)
√
Λ
)
x+ x>
(
C¯ ˜¯CC¯ − θC¯)(t)x ≥ 0.
As Λ > 0, Theorem A.1 implies C¯(l, t) ≤ P¯ (l, t) and therefore 0 < Pˆ (l, t) ≤ C(l, t) on (τ, T ]. By continuity
of C(l, ·), we have 0 < Pˆ (l, τ) ≤ C(l, τ) and thus C(l, t) > 0 in some neighborhood of τ , a contradiction to
Assumption (25). Hence, C(l, t) is positive definite on the whole interval (t1, T ]. Applying Theorem A.1 in the
same way as above again, yields that we may choose t1 = −∞ and that 0 < Pˆ (l, t) ≤ C(l, t) on (−∞, T ]. A
similar argument establishes Q as an upper bound by using 0 ≤ CC˜C instead of Inequality (20).
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5.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Before we begin, we introduce the following notation.
Notation 5.3. (i) We denote the jump times of pi by (τj)j∈N, where τj < τj+1 (j ∈ N) almost surely (with
the convention τ0 = t).
(ii) Given the Markovian control u∗(l), the Stochastic Differential Equation (1) possesses a unique solution.
We denote the process controlled by u∗(l) by
X∗(l, s) := Xu
∗(l)(s).
In order to prove admissibility of u∗(l), we show that ‖X∗(l, ·)‖2 is bounded by using Gronwall’s inequality
pathwise inductively on the time-intervals [τi ∧ T, τi+1 ∧ T ) and interlacing the jumps (cf. Remark 2.4). This
can be achieved by applying the upper and lower bounds of C(l, s) from Theorem 3.2.
Lemma 5.4. Let l > l0 for l0 as in Equation (5), t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ Rn be the portfolio position at time t and
θ =
∑
i θi as before. Then the following hold.
(i) For s ∈ [t, T ),
X∗(l, s)>C(l, s)X∗(l, s) ≤ exp(θ(s− t))x>C(l, t)x a.s.
(ii) There exists a constant K independent of l such that for all s ∈ [t, T ), ‖X∗(l, s)‖2 ≤ K a.s.
Proof. (i) Let i ∈ N. On {τi < T}, X∗(l, ·) solves the initial value problem
X ′ = −Λ−1C(l)X, X(τi) = X∗(l, τi)
for s ∈ [τi, τi+1 ∧ T ). Hence, as C(l) solves the Initial Value Problem (3),
∂
∂s
(
X∗(l, s)>C(l, s)X∗(l, s)
)
=
∂
∂s
X∗(l, s)>C(l, s)X∗(l, s) +X∗(l, s)>
∂
∂s
C(l, s)X∗(l, s) +X∗(l, s)>C(l, s)
∂
∂s
X∗(l, s)
= −X∗(l, s)>C(l, s)Λ−1C(l, s)X∗(l, s) +X∗(l, s)>C(l, s)Λ−1C(l, s)X∗(l, s)
+X∗(l, s)>C(l, s)C˜(l, s)C(l, s)X∗(l, s)− αX∗(l, s)>ΣX∗(l, s)
−X∗(l, s)>C(l, s)Λ−1C(l, s)X∗(l, s)
≤ θX∗(l, s)>C(l, s)X∗(l, s)
by Corollary 5.2 and the fact that C,Λ−1,Σ ≥ 0. By Gronwall’s inequality, this implies
X∗(l, s)>C(l, s)X∗(l, s) ≤ exp(θ(s− τi))x>C(l, t)x. (26)
Now, on {τi+1 < T}, there exits an (almost surely) unique j = 1, . . . , n (cf. Assumption 2.2 (ii)) such that
X∗(l, τi+1) = X∗(l, τi+1−)− η∗j (l, τi+1, X∗(l, τi+1−))ej .
Let η ∈ R. Then
(X∗(l, τi+1−)− ηej)>C(l, τi+1)(X∗(l, τi+1−)− ηej)
= X∗(l, τi+1−)>C(l, τi+1)X∗(l, τi+1−) + η2e>j C(l, τi+1)ej − 2ηe>j C(l, τi+1)X∗(l, τi+1−)
= X∗(l, τi+1−)>C(l, τi+1)X∗(l, τi+1−) +
(
η
√
cj,j(l, τi+1)− 1√
cj,j(l, τi+1)
e>j C(l, τi+1)X
∗(l, τi+1−)
)2
− 1
cj,j(l, τi+1)
(e>j C(l, τi+1)X
∗(l, τi+1−))2,
which attains its (unique) minimum in η for η = η∗j (l, τi+1, X∗(l, τi+1−)). Hence,(
X∗(l, τi+1−)− η∗j (l, τi+1, X∗(l, τi+1−))ej
)>
C(l, τi+1)
(
X∗(l, τi+1−)− η∗j (l, τi+1, X∗(l, τi+1−))ej
)
= min
η∈R
(
X∗(l, τi+1−)− ηej
)>
C(l, τi+1)
(
X∗(l, τi+1−)− ηej
)
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and therefore
X∗(l, τi+1)>C(l, τi+1)X∗(l, τi+1) ≤ X∗(l, τi+1−)>C(l, τi+1)X∗(l, τi+1−). (27)
Using Inequalities (26) and (27) inductively, we obtain the assertion.
(ii) By Theorem 3.2, we have Λ ≤ 1/p(l, s)C(l, s) and hence,
X∗(l, s)>ΛX∗(l, s) ≤ 1
p(l, s)
X∗(l, s)>C(l, s)X∗(l, s) (28)
≤ 1
p(l0, s)
X∗(l, s)>C(l, s)X∗(l, s)
≤ K˜x>C(l, t)x
for a constant K˜ independent of s by (i) and the fact that p(l0) attains its minimum in [t, T ). The assertion
follows as q(t) := liml→∞ q(l, t) < ∞ exists (cf. Equations (23) and (24), cf. also Lemma 5.6 below) and
C(l, t) ≤ λmaxq(t) (cf. Theorem 3.2).
The bound obtained in Lemma 5.4 enables us to prove that u∗(l) fulfills the moment conditions of Defini-
tion 2.3 (ii) and hence Proposition 3.4.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Definition 2.3 (i) and (iii) are clearly satisfied.
Let ‖ · ‖2,2 denote the matrix norm induced by the space (Rn, ‖ · ‖2). Note that ‖ · ‖2,2 is the spectral norm
on Rn×n and therefore (see, e.g., Bernstein [2005], Theorem 8.4.9) ‖A‖2,2 ≤ ‖B‖2,2 for 0 ≤ A ≤ B. Using
Theorem 3.2 and 5.4 (ii), we deduce
E
[ ∫ T
t
‖ξ∗(l, s,X∗(s))‖42ds
]
≤ E
[ ∫ T
t
‖Λ−1‖42,2‖C(l, s)‖42,2‖X∗(l, s)‖42ds
]
≤ E
[ ∫ T
t
q(l, s)4K4ds
]
<∞,
for K as in Lemma 5.4 (ii). Similarly,
E
[ ∫ T
t
‖η∗(l, s,X∗(s−))‖82ds
]
≤ E
[ ∫ T
t
‖C¯(l, s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤nC(l,s)−1 by Corollary 5.2
‖82,2‖C(l, s)‖82,2‖X∗(l, s−)‖82ds
]
≤ E
[ ∫ T
t
n8λ8maxq(l, s)
8
λ8minp(l, s)
8
K8ds
]
<∞.
5.3 Proof of Theorem 3.5
We first require the following moment estimate for the controlled process.
Lemma 5.5. Let t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ Rn and u ∈ A˜(t). Then
E
[
sup
t≤s≤T
‖Xu(s)‖42
]
<∞, in particular E
[ ∫ T
t
‖Xu(s)‖42ds
]
<∞.
Proof. Let s ∈ [t, T ]. Then by Hölder’s inequality and a multi-dimensional version of Jensen’s inequality (see,
e.g., Kallenberg [2002], Lemma 3.5) we obtain
‖Xu(s)‖42 ≤
(
‖x‖2 +
∥∥∥∫ s
t
ξ(r)dr
∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥∫ s
t
η(r)dpi(r)
∥∥∥
2
)4
≤ 27
(
‖x‖42 + (s− t)3
∫ s
t
‖ξ(r)‖42dr +
∥∥∥∫ s
t
η(r)dpi(r)
∥∥∥4
2
)
. (29)
By Definition 2.3 (ii), it is hence sufficient to consider the last summand of Equation (29). To this end we
define the compensated Poisson processesMi(s) := pii(s)−θis, i = 1, . . . , n. We note that Poisson distributed
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random variables have finite moments and apply Itô’s isometry (note that 〈Mi〉(s) = θis) and Hölder’s inequality
to obtain
E
[∣∣∣ ∫ s
t
ηi(r)dpii(r)
∣∣∣4] ≤ E[(pii(s)− pii(t))3(∫ s
t
|ηi(r)|4dMi(r) + θi
∫ s
t
|ηi(r)|4dr
)]
≤ E
[(
pii(s)− pii(t)
)6] 12(E[(∫ s
t
|ηi(r)|4dMi(r)
)2] 12
+ E
[(
θi
∫ s
t
|ηi(r)|4dr
)2] 12)
< Ki
for a constant Ki independent of s by Definition 2.3 (ii), which finishes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Let l > l0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) ×Rn and u = (ξ, η) ∈ A˜(t). We apply Itô’s formula (see, e.g.,
the book by Øksendal and Sulem [2007]) to the function w(l, t,Xu(t)) = Xu(t)>C(l, t)Xu(t).
w(l, t, x) = w(l, T,Xu(T )) +
∫ T
t
∇xw(l, s,Xu(s))ξ(s)− ∂w
∂s
(l, s,Xu(s))ds
+
∫ T
t
( n∑
i=1
w(l, s,Xu(s−))− w(l, s,Xu(s−)− ηi(s)ei))pii(ds)
≤ w(l, T,Xu(T )) +
∫ T
t
f(Xu(s), ξ(s))ds
+
∫ T
t
( n∑
i=1
w(l, s,Xu(s−))− w(l, s,Xu(s−)− ηi(s)ei))pii(ds)
−
∫ T
t
( n∑
i=1
θi
(
w(l, s,Xu(s−))− w(l, s,Xu(s−)− ηi(s)ei))ds (30)
= w(l, T,Xu(T )) +
∫ T
t
f(Xu(s), ξ(s))ds+
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t
(
w(l, s,Xu(s−))− w(l, s,Xu(s−)−ηi(s)ei))Mi(ds),
where Mi is the compensated Poisson process Mi(s) := pii(s) − θis and Inequality (30) follows from Proposi-
tion 2.5. Furthermore, we have (pathwise) equality in (30) if and only if u = u∗ λ - a.s.
Taking expectations on both sides, we obtain
w(l, t, x) ≤ J˜(l, t, x, u) +
n∑
i=1
E
[ ∫ T
t
(
w(l, s,Xu(s−))− w(l, s,Xu(s−)− ηi(s)ei))Mi(ds)], (31)
with equality if and only if u = u∗ P⊗ λ - a.s.
It remains to show that the stochastic integrals in Inequality (31) are martingales. To this end, we compute
E
[ ∫ T
t
|w(l, s,Xu(s−))− w(l, s,Xu(s−)− ηi(s)ei)|2ds]
= E
[ ∫ T
t
|2Xu(s−)>C(l, s)eiηi(s)− ηi(s)2ci,i(s, l)|2ds
]
≤ E
[ ∫ T
t
2|2Xu(s−)>C(l, s)eiηi(s)|2ds
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
t
2|ηi(s)2ci,i(l, s)|2ds
]
≤ 8E
[ ∫ T
t
‖Xu(s−)>‖22‖C(l, s)‖22,2|ηi(s)|2ds
]
+ 2E
[ ∫ T
t
|ηi(s)|4|ci,i(l, s)|2ds
]
≤ 8λ2max
(
max
s∈[t,T ]
q(l, s)2
)
E
[ ∫ T
t
‖Xu(s−)‖42ds
] 1
2E
[ ∫ T
t
‖η(s)‖42ds
] 1
2
+ 2λ2max
(
max
s∈[t,T ]
q(l, s)2
)
E
[ ∫ T
t
‖η(s)‖42ds
]
(32)
<∞
by Definition 2.3 (ii) and Lemma 5.5, where Inequality (32) follows from Hölder’s inequality. As 〈Mi〉(s) = θis,
this finishes the proof.
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5.4 Proof of Theorem 3.6
We start by computing the limits of the functions p(l) and q(l) given by Equations (22) and (23) respectively (24).
Lemma 5.6. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and p(l) and q(l) as in Equations (22) and (23) respectively (24). Then
lim
l→∞
p(l, ·) = p(·), lim
l→∞
q(l, ·) = q(·),
where p and q are given by
p(t) :=
√
θ2
4 + αdmin coth
(√
θ2
4 + αdmin(T − t)
)
− θ
2
, (33)
q(t) :=
√
αdmax coth
(√
αdmax(T − t)
)
(34)
for θ + αdmin > 0 respectively αdmax > 0 and
p(t) := q(t) :=
1
T − t , (35)
for θ = αdmin = 0 respectively αdmax = 0. The convergence is compact and strictly increasing on [0, T ).
Furthermore, p(l, T ), q(l, T )↗∞ as l→∞.
Proof. Point-wise convergence and the formulae for the limits are straightforward by Equations (22) and (23)
respectively by Equation (24). Strict monotonicity follows from the fact that the initial values are strictly
increasing in l. Finally, compact convergence follows from these observations by Dini’s theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.6. (i) Note first that Theorem 3.5 implies that for fixed t ∈ (−∞, T ], C(l, t) is increasing
in l on (l0,∞) for l0 as in Equation (5) in the sense of Notation 3.1 (i). The existence of the element-wise
limit of (C(l, t))l>0 follows directly from this monotonicity and the boundedness by Λq(t)I for q(t) as in
Equation (34) respectively (35). Compact convergence follows by Dini’s theorem due to the monotonicity.
Finally, p(l, T )↗∞ implies liml→∞ cmin(l, T ) =∞.
(ii) The inequalities in (10) follow directly from Lemma 5.6 and (i). Furthermore, the compact convergence of
C(l, t) (and C˜(l, t)) on [0, T ) and the fact that C(l, ·) solves the Matrix Differential Equation (9) implies
C(t) = lim
l→∞
C(l, t) = lim
l→∞
∫ t
0
(
CΛ−1C + CC˜C − αΣ)(l, s)ds+ lim
l→∞
C(l, 0)
=
t∫
0
(
CΛ−1C + CC˜C − αΣ)(s)ds+ C(0)
and hence that C solves the Differential Equation (9) with boundary condition lims→T− cmin(s) =∞ (as
lims→T− p(s) =∞).
5.5 Proof of Theorem 3.8
We start by proving the following bounds for X∗(l) and X∗.
Lemma 5.7. Let t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ Rn be the portfolio position at time t.
(i) Let l > l0 for l0 as in Equation (5) and s ∈ [t, T ). Then (cf. Notation 5.3 (i)),
X∗(l, s)>ΛX∗(l, s) ≤ x>Λx exp
(
− 2
∫ s
t
p(l, u)du
) ∏
t≤τi≤s
q(l, τi)
p(l, τi)
(36)
≤ x>Λx exp (θ(s− t))(T − s+ 2λmax2l+θλmax )2(
T − t+ 2λmax2l+θλmax
)2 ∏
t≤τi≤s
q(l, τi)
p(l, τi)
a.s., (37)
where p and q are as in Equations (22) and (23) respectively as in (24).
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(ii) Let s ∈ [t, T ). Then
X∗(s)>ΛX∗(s) ≤ x>Λx exp (θ(s− t))(T − s)2(
T − t)2
∏
t≤τi≤s
q(τi)
p(τi)
a.s.,
where p and q are as in Equations (33) and (34) respectively as in (35).
Proof. We prove (i); (ii) follows by exactly the same line of reasoning with the respective bounds. Let i ∈ N.
Observe that on {τi < T}
∂
∂s
(
X∗(l, s)>ΛX∗(l, s)
)
= −2X∗(l, s)>C(l, s)X∗(l, s) ≤ −2p(l, s)X∗(l, s)>ΛX∗(l, s)
for s ∈ [τi, τi+1 ∧ T ) by Theorem 3.2. Gronwall’s inequality implies
X∗(l, s)>ΛX∗(l, s) ≤ X∗(l, τi)>ΛX∗(l, τi) exp
(
− 2
∫ s
τi
p(l, r)dr
)
,
in particular
X∗(l, (τi+1 ∧ T )−)>ΛX∗(l, (τi+1 ∧ T )−) ≤ X∗(l, τi)>ΛX∗(l, τi) exp
(
− 2
∫ τi+1∧T
τi
p(l, r)dr
)
. (38)
This implies (cf. Inequalities (27) and (28) in the proof of Lemma 5.4)
X∗(l, τi+1)>ΛX∗(l, τi+1) ≤ 1
p(l, τi+1)
X∗(l, τi+1−)>C(l, τi+1)X∗(l, τi+1−)
≤ q(l, τi+1)
p(l, τi+1)
X∗(l, τi+1−)>ΛX∗(l, τi+1−) a.s. (39)
Using Inequalities (38) and (39), we obtain Inequality (36) inductively as before. Inequality (37) follows from
1
T − r + 2λmax2l+θλmax
− θ
2
≤ p(l, r)
which is a direct consequence of Corollary A.2.
The main step in the proof of the admissibility of u∗ is to show that the liquidation constraint holds
(cf. Definition 2.3 (iv)). This is (in particular) accomplished in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.8. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ Rn be the portfolio position at time t.
(i) X∗(l, ·) l→∞−→ X∗(·) a.s. compactly on [t, T ).
(ii) l · ‖X∗(l, T )‖22 l→∞−→ 0 a.s. and in L1 and X∗(l, T ) l→∞−→ X∗(T ) = lim
s→T−
X∗(s) = 0 a.s.
Proof. (i) The spectral norm ‖·‖2,2 is equivalent to the matrix maximum norm, and therefore the element-wise
convergence results from Theorem 3.6 (i) transfer to the corresponding results for the spectral norm.
Let t ≤ T ′ < T . On {τi < T ′}, X∗ and X∗(l) solve the respective ordinary differential equations
X ′ = −ξ∗(·, X) = −Λ−1CX, X ′ = −ξ∗(l, ·, X) = −Λ−1C(l)X
on the interval [τi, τi+1 ∧ T ′). We prove that the assertion follows from the continuous dependence of
solutions of ordinary differential equations on the right hand side and initial values. To this end, we first
require some preliminary observations.
For s ∈ [t, T ′] and x, y ∈ Rn, we have
‖Λ−1C(s)x− Λ−1C(s)y‖2 ≤ max
s∈[t,T ′]
‖Q(s)‖2,2‖x− y‖2 =: L‖x− y‖2
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(cf. Theorem 3.6 (ii)), i.e., for all s ∈ [t, T ′], ξ∗(s, ·) is Lipschitz continuous on Rn with Lipschitz constant
L = L(T ′) independent of s. Furthermore, there exits a constant K1 ≥ 1 such that for s ∈ [t, T ′],
‖C¯(s)C(s)‖2,2 ≤ K1. We now show by induction on i ∈ N that for all  > 0, there exits an li > l0 such
that li ≥ li−1 and for all l ≥ li, s ∈ [t, τi ∧ T ′], ‖X∗(l, s)−X∗(s)‖2 < .
The assertion is clear for i = 0. Let i > 0 and  > 0. By the induction hypothesis, there exists li−1 > l0
such that for l > li−1,
‖X∗(l, τi−1)−X∗(τi−1)‖2 < e
−L(T ′−t)
6K1
. (40)
Note that on {τi−1 ≥ T ′} the induction step is trivial. We therefore fix some ω ∈ {τi−1 < T ′}. Let
now li ≥ li−1 such that for l > li, s ≤ τi ∧ T ′ (recall the uniform convergence of (C(l, s))l on [t, T ′],
Theorem 3.6 (i))
‖Λ−1C(l, s)− Λ−1C(s)‖2,2 ≤ ‖Λ−1‖2,2‖C(l, s)− C(s)‖2,2 <  e
−L(T ′−t)
6(T ′ − t)K1 (41)
and
‖C¯(l, s)C(l, s)− C¯(s)C(s)‖2,2 < 
3K2
(42)
for K as in Lemma 5.4 (ii). By the continuous dependence of solutions of systems of ordinary differential
equations on the right hand side and initial values, we have for s ∈ [τi−1, τi ∧ T ′) (by Inequalities (40),
and (41)),
‖X∗(l, s, ω)−X∗(s, ω)‖2 ≤
(

e−L(T
′−t)
6K1
+ (T ′ − t) e
−L(T ′−t)
6(T ′ − t)K1
)
eL(T
′−t) =

3K1
,
in particular
‖X∗(l, (τi ∧ T ′)−)−X∗((τi ∧ T ′)−)‖2 ≤ 
3K1
. (43)
We can conclude by using the Inequalities (42) and (43):
‖X∗(l, τi(ω) ∧ T ′, ω)−X∗(τi ∧ T ′, ω)‖2
=
∥∥X∗(l, (τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω)− C¯(l, τi(ω) ∧ T ′)C(l, τi(ω) ∧ T ′)X∗(l, (τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω)
−X∗((τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω) + C¯(τi(ω) ∧ T ′)C(τi(ω) ∧ T ′)X∗((τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω)‖2
≤ ‖X∗(l, (τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω)−X∗((τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω)
∥∥
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤/(3K1)≤/3 by Inequality (43)
+ ‖X∗(l, (τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω)‖2‖C¯(l, τi(ω) ∧ T ′)C(l, τi(ω) ∧ T ′)− C¯(τi(ω) ∧ T ′)C(τi(ω) ∧ T ′)‖2,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤/3 by Inequality (42)
+ ‖C¯(τi(ω) ∧ T ′)C(τi(ω) ∧ T ′)‖2‖X∗(l, (τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω)−X∗((τi(ω) ∧ T ′)−, ω)‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
</3 by Inequality (43)
< 
as required.
(ii) For fixed ω ∈ Ω, we have by Lemma 5.7 (i) that
l · ‖X∗(l, T, ω)‖22 ≤
1
λmin
x>Λx exp
(
θ(T − t)) l( 2λmax2l+θλmax )2(
T − t+ 2λmax2l+θλmax
)2 ∏
t≤τi≤s
q(l, τi)
p(l, τi)
. (44)
Furthermore,
E
[ ∏
t≤τi≤T
q(l, τi)
p(l, τi)
]
< K2 <∞
for some constant K2 independent of l; thus for almost all ω ∈ Ω, there exists a constant K3(ω) such that∏
t≤τi(ω)≤T
q(l, τi(ω))
p(l, τi(ω))
< K3(ω).
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Therefore, Inequality (44) implies
E
[
l · ‖X∗(l, T, ω)‖22
] l→∞−→ 0 and l · ‖X∗(l, T, ω)‖22 l→∞−→ 0 a.s.
Finally, Lemma 5.7 (ii) implies that lim
s→T−
‖X∗(s)‖2 = 0 a.s., finishing the proof.
We are now able to prove that u∗ is indeed an admissible liquidation strategy. The main step towards this
goal is accomplished by Proposition 5.8 (ii). It remains thus to show that u∗ fulfills the moment conditions in
Definition 2.3 (ii).
Proof of Theorem 3.8. Definition 2.3 (i) and (iii) are clear and (iv) follows from Proposition 5.8 (ii).
Furthermore, we have
E
[ ∫ T
t
‖ξ(s,X∗(s))‖42ds
]
≤ E
[ ∫ T
t
q(s)4‖X∗(s)‖42ds
]
<∞
by Lemma 5.4 (ii) and Proposition 5.8 (i). Finally, C¯(s) ≤ nC(s)−1 by Corollary 5.2 and thus, as q(s)p(s) admits
a continuous extension on [t, T ], there exists a constant K¯ independent of s such that
‖C¯(s)C(s)‖82,2 ≤ n8‖C−1‖82,2‖C‖82,2 ≤
n8λ8maxq(s)
8
λ8minp(s)
8
≤ K¯. (45)
Using Lemma 5.4 (ii) and Proposition 5.8 (i) again, we can deduce from Inequality (45) that
E
[ ∫ T
t
‖η(s,X∗(s−)‖82ds
]
≤ E
[ ∫ T
t
‖C¯(s)C(s)‖82‖X∗(s−)‖82ds
]
<∞.
5.6 Proof of Theorem 3.9
We can directly deduce compact convergence of the optimal trading intensity in the primary venue from Theo-
rem 3.6 (i) and Proposition 5.8 (i).
Corollary 5.9. Let t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ Rn be the portfolio position at time t. Then
ξ∗(l, ·, X∗(l, ·)) −→ ξ∗(·, X∗(·)) a.s. compactly on [t, T )
as l→∞.
This enables us to finally prove the main result of the article.
Proof of Theorem 3.9. We fix t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ Rn. Note first that we have
v(t, x) ≥ lim
l→∞
v˜(l, t, x). (46)
For the converse inequality, let A := {pi(T ) = pi(t)} be the set of scenarios without any dark pool execution in
[0, T ] and K : (l0,∞)× Ω −→ [0,∞] be the following cost function:
K(l, ω) :=
∫ T
t
(
ξ∗(l, s,X∗(l, s, ω))>Λξ∗(l, s,X∗(l, s, ω)) + αX∗(l, s, ω)>ΣX∗(l, s, ω)
)
ds+ l‖X∗(l, T, ω)‖22.
Then P[A] > 0 and for ω ∈ A, K(l, A) := K(l, ω) is independent of the specific scenario ω almost surely. By
optimality of u∗(l) (Theorem 3.5), K(l, A) is an upper bound for K(l, ·) almost surely. As liml→∞ v˜(l, t, x) is
bounded and P[A] > 0, there exists a constant K such that for all l > l0, K(l, A) ≤ K. By the dominated
convergence theorem this implies
lim
l→∞
v˜(l, t, x) = lim
l→∞
E[K(l)] = E[ lim
l→∞
K(l)].
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By Proposition 5.8 and Corollary 5.9, the limit in the last expression exists, so Fatou’s lemma yields
lim
l→∞
v˜(l, t, x)
≥ E
[ ∫ T
t
lim
l→∞
(
ξ∗(l, s,X∗(l, s))>Λξ∗(l, s,X∗(l, s)) + αX∗(l, s)>ΣX∗(l, s)
)
ds+ lim
l→∞
l · ‖X∗(l, T )‖22
]
= E
[ ∫ T
t
(
ξ∗(s,X∗(s))>Λξ∗(s,X∗(s)) + αX∗(s)>ΣX∗(s)
)
ds
]
≥ v(t, x). (47)
The Inequalities (46) and (47) establish that u∗ solves the Optimization Problem (OPT) and that the value
function is given by v. For uniqueness, let u = (ξ, η), u˜ = (ξ˜, η˜) ∈ A(t, x) and µ ∈ (0, 1). We define the convex
combination u¯ = (ξ¯, η¯):
ξ¯(s) = µξ(s) + (1− µ)ξ˜(s), η¯(s) = µη(s) + (1− µ)η˜(s)
for s ∈ [t, T ). Thus, X u¯(s) = µXu(s) + (1− µ)X u˜(s) and u¯ ∈ A(t, x). Notice that
P⊗ λ[u 6= u˜] > 0 implies P⊗ λ[ξ 6= ξ˜] > 0 (48)
as else P[lims→T−Xu(s) 6= lims→T−X u˜(s)] > 0, a contradiction to Definition 2.3 (iv). Hence,
J(t, x, u¯) = E
[ ∫ T
t
f
(
ξ¯(r), X u¯(r)
)
dr
]
≤ E
[ ∫ T
t
µf
(
ξ(r), Xu(r)
)
+ (1− µ)f(ξ˜(r), X u˜(r))dr] (49)
= µJ(t, x, u) + (1− µ)J(t, x, u˜),
where Inequality (49) follows from the convexity of f . We have equality in Inequality (49) if and only if u = u˜
P⊗ λ - a.s. by strict convexity of f in the first argument and (48).
6 Proofs of the results of Section 4
6.1 Proofs of the results of Section 4.1
We first require the following elementary result.
Lemma 6.1. Let 0 < a < b, x > 0. Then
0 >
d
dx
sinh(ax)
sinh(bx)
> (a− b) sinh(ax)
sinh(bx)
.
Proof. Note first that
d
dx
sinh(ax)
sinh(bx)
=
a cosh(ax) sinh(bx)− b cosh(bx) sinh(ax)
sinh2(bx)
. (50)
The result follows from elementary calculus (see Kratz [2011] for details).
Proof of Proposition 4.1. We let t ∈ [0, T ) and compute
∂
∂θ
C(t; θ) =
Λθ coth
(
θ˜
2 (T − t)
)
2θ˜
− Λθ(T − t)
4 sinh2
(
θ˜
2 (T − t)
) − Λ
2
≤ Λθ
(
cosh
(
θ˜
2 (T − t)
)
sinh
(
θ˜
2 (T − t)
)− θ˜2 (T − t)− sinh2 ( θ˜2 (T − t)))
2θ˜ sinh2
(
θ˜
2 (T − t)
) < 0
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for θ > 0 since
cosh
( θ˜
2
(T − t)) sinh ( θ˜
2
(T − t))− θ˜
2
(T − t)− sinh2 ( θ˜
2
(T − t))
= sinh
( θ˜
2
(T − t))( cosh ( θ˜
2
(T − t))− sinh ( θ˜
2
(T − t)))− θ˜
2
(T − t)
=
(1− exp(−θ˜(T − t))
2
)
− θ˜
2
(T − t) < 0
(note that 12
(
1− exp(−2x))− x < 0 for x > 0). This establishes the first and the second assertion directly; the
third assertion follows from the first equality in Equation (12). For the proof of (iv), we note first that
E[X∗(t; θ)] = P[pi(t) = 0] · X˜(t; θ) = sinh
(
θ˜
2 (T − t)
)
exp
(− θ2 t)
sinh
(
θ˜
2T
) x. (51)
We compute for θ > 0,
∂
∂θ
E[X∗(t; θ)] =
x
sinh2
(
θ˜
2T
)(θ(T − t)
2θ˜
sinh
( θ˜
2
T
)
cosh
( θ˜
2
(T − t)) exp (− θ
2
t
)
− t
2
sinh
( θ˜
2
T
)
sinh
( θ˜
2
(T − t)) exp (− θ
2
t
)− θT
2θ˜
cosh
( θ˜
2
T
)
sinh
( θ˜
2
(T − t)) exp (− θ
2
t
))
<
θ exp
(− θ2 t)x
2θ˜ sinh2
(
θ˜
2T
) ((T − t) sinh ( θ˜
2
T
)
cosh
( θ˜
2
(T − t))− T cosh ( θ˜
2
T
)
sinh
( θ˜
2
(T − t))) < 0
by Lemma 6.1 (cf. also Equation (50)), finishing the proof of (iv).
We have
E[X∗(t; θ)2] = P[pi(t) = 0] · X˜(t; θ)2 = sinh
(
θ˜
2 (T − t)
)
sinh
(
θ˜
2T
) x2.
This term is differentiable and strictly decreasing in θ by Lemma 6.1 (note that θ˜ is strictly increasing in θ).
Thus, by Fubini’s theorem,
∂
∂θ
E
[ T∫
0
X∗(t; θ)2dt
]
=
∂
∂θ
T∫
0
E[X∗(t; θ)2]dt =
T∫
0
∂
∂θ
E[X∗(t; θ)2]dt < 0,
establishing (v).
Finally, we note that
E[ξ∗(t,X∗(t; θ); θ)2] = P[pi(t) = 0] · C(t; θ)
2
Λ2
X˜(t; θ)2 =
C(t; θ)2
Λ2
E[X∗(t; θ)2]
by Equation (51). This term is differentiable and strictly decreasing in θ as both terms are positive and strictly
increasing in θ. Similarly as before, we deduce (vi).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. (i) follows directly from the cost functional J . For (ii), we compute
∂
∂Λ
ξ∗(t; Λ) =
1
2
∂θ˜
∂Λ
(cosh ( θ˜2 (T − t)) sinh ( θ˜2 (T − t))− θ˜2 (T − t)
sinh2
(
θ˜
2 (T − t)
) ) < 0
as ∂θ˜∂Λ < 0. Monotonicity of X˜ follows as in the proof of Proposition 4.1 (iii). A similar calculation yields
∂
∂(αΣ)
ξ∗(t;αΣ) > 0
as ∂θ˜∂(αΣ) > 0, finishing the proof.
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6.2 Proofs of the results of Section 4.2
Proof of Proposition 4.3. We have v(t, x − ηei) = (x − ηei)>C(t)(x − ηei) which can easily be seen to be
minimized by η∗1(t, x).
Proof of Proposition 4.5. We prove the case x1, x2 > 0, ρ < 0, i.e., x is well diversified. Let u∗ be the optimal
strategy for the initial portfolio position (x1,−x2)>. For (x1, x2)>, we define the strategy u ∈ A(t, (x1, x2)>) in
such a way that for i = 1, 2, s ≥ t, Xui (s) ≥ 0 and |Xui (s)| = |Xu
∗
i (s)|; this is achieved by changing the signs of
the trading intensities and by adjusting the dark pool orders appropriately if necessary. In particular, we have
|ξi(s,Xu(s))| = |ξ∗i (s,Xu
∗
(s))| and both strategies yield the same impact costs. On the other hand, the risk
costs of u are strictly smaller as ρ < 0. Hence,
v(t, (x1,−x2)>) = J(t, (x1,−x2)>, u∗) > J(t, (x1, x2)>, u) ≥ v(t, (x1, x2)>)
as desired. The remaining cases follow accordingly.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. We prove the case x1, x2 > 0, ρ < ρ˜ < 0 and proceed similarly as in the proof of
Proposition 4.5. Let u˜ be the optimal strategy for ρ˜. For ρ, we define the strategy u ∈ A(t, x) in such a way
that for i = 1, 2, s ≥ t, Xui (s) ≥ 0 and |Xui (s)| = |X u˜i (s)|. As ρ < ρ˜ < 0, this yields
v(t, x; ρ) ≤ J(t, x, u; ρ) < J(t, x, u˜; ρ˜) = v(t, x; ρ˜).
The remaining cases follow in the same way.
For the proof of Proposition 4.7, we first require the following symmetry results of the value function.
Lemma 6.2. Let t ∈ [0, T ), x ∈ R2 and ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. Then, v(t, x; ρ) = v(t,−x, ; ρ) and v(t, (x1, x2)>; ρ) =
v(t, (x1,−x2)>;−ρ).
Proof. We have J(t, x, u) = J(t,−x,−u) and hence the first assertion follows. The second assertion follows
from J(t, (x1, x2)>, (u1, u2)>; ρ) = J(t, (x1,−x2)>, (u1,−u2)>;−ρ).
Proof of Proposition 4.7. (i) The first assertion follows directly from C(t) > 0. The second assertion follows
from Lemma 6.2 as for i = 1, 2, ci,i(t, ρ) = v(t, ei; ρ) = v(t, ei;−ρ) = ci,i(t,−ρ). We directly deduce the
third assertion as
c1,1(t; ρ) + c2,2(t; ρ) + 2c1,2(t, ρ) = v(t, (1, 1)
>; ρ) = v(t, (1,−1)>;−ρ) = c1,1(t; ρ) + c2,2(t; ρ)− 2c1,2(t;−ρ).
Finally, it follows for ρ < 0 (ρ > 0) by Proposition 4.5 that
c1,1(t; ρ) + c2,2(t; ρ) + 2c1,2(t; ρ) = v(t, (1, 1)
>; ρ) < (>)v(t, (1, 1)>;−ρ) = c1,1(t; ρ) + c2,2(t; ρ)− 2c1,2(t; ρ)
and therefore c1,2(t; ρ) < 0 (c1,2(t; ρ) > 0).
(ii) For the monotonicity of c1,1(t; ·), we let ρ < ρ˜ < 0 and proceed similarly as in the proofs of Propositions 4.5
and 4.6. Let u˜ be the optimal strategy for ρ˜. For ρ, we define the strategy u ∈ A(t, e1) in such a way that
for i = 1, 2, s ≥ t, Xui (s) ≥ 0 and |Xui (s)| = |X u˜i (s)|. As ρ < ρ˜ < 0, this yields J(t, e1, u; ρ) ≤ J(t, e1, u˜; ρ˜)
with equality if and only if X u˜2 (s) = 0 a.s. However, we have ξ2(t, e1) = 1/λ2c1,2(t; ρ˜) < 0 and hence
X u˜2 > 0 in some neighborhood of t with positive probability. Thus,
c1,1(t; ρ) = v(t, e1; ρ) ≤ J(t, e1, u; ρ) < J(t, e1, u˜; ρ˜) = v(t, e1, u˜; ρ˜) = c1,1(t; ρ˜).
The monotonicity of c2,2 and the case ρ > 0 follow by the same line of reasoning.
Before we proceed, we remark that all symmetry properties and the monotonicity of c1,1 and c2,2 in ρ also
hold for C(l) (l ≥ l0) with exactly the same proofs. We now prove monotonicity of c1,2(l, t; ρ) (l ≥ l0)
first; monotonicity of c1,2(t; ρ) then follows directly from the fact that liml→∞ c1,2(l, t; ρ) = c1,2(t; ρ). A
straightforward computation confirms that c1,2(l) fulfills the following scalar initial value problem
∂
∂t
c1,2(l, t; ρ) = c1,2(l, t; ρ)
(c1,1(l, t; ρ)
λ1
+
c2,2(l, t; ρ)
λ2
+ θ1 + θ2
)
− ασ1σ2ρ, c1,2(l, T ; ρ) = 0. (52)
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By the continuous differentiable dependence of c1,2 on the parameter ρ, we can exchange differentiation
with respect to t and ρ and obtain the following initial value problem for ∂c1,2∂ρ :
∂
∂t
∂c1,2
∂ρ
(l, t; ρ) =
∂c1,2
∂ρ
(l, t; ρ)f(l, t; ρ)− g(l, t; ρ), ∂c1,2
∂ρ
(l, T ; ρ) = 0
for
f(l, t; ρ) :=
c1,1(l, t; ρ)
λ1
+
c2,2(l, t; ρ)
λ2
+ θ1 + θ2,
g(l, t; ρ) := ασ1σ2 − c1,2(l, t; ρ)
( 1
λ1
∂c1,1(l, t; ρ)
∂ρ
+
1
λ2
∂c2,2(l, t; ρ)
∂ρ
)
;
this implies
∂c1,2
∂ρ
(l, t; ρ) = exp
(∫ t
T
f(l, s; ρ)ds
)∫ T
t
g(l, r; ρ) exp
(∫ T
r
f(l, s; ρ)ds
)
dr > 0
as g(l, t; ρ) ≥ 0 by (i) and the monotonicity of c1,1(l, t; ·) and c2,2(l, t; ·).
Proof of Proposition 4.8. (i) We prove the assertion for x1, x2 > 0 and ρ < 0. Let j ∈ N. We assume that
X∗i (τj) > 0 (i = 1, 2) on {τj < T} (cf. Notation 5.3). We compare the initial value problem for the
controlled process on [τj , τj+1 ∧ T ) (cf. Equations (14)) with the case ρ = 0; as c1,2(s; ρ) < c1,2(s; 0) = 0
and 0 < ci,i(s; ρ) < ci,i(s; 0) by Proposition 4.7, X∗i (s; ρ) ≥ X∗i (s; 0) for s ∈ [τj , τj+1 ∧ T ). For ρ = 0
the two components of X∗ evolve independently according to the results of Section 4.1. In particular, the
optimal asset position remains positive in [τj , τj+1 ∧ T ). It follows that X∗i (s; ρ) > 0 for all s < τj+1 ∧ T
and that X∗i (τj+1−) > 0 on {τj+1 < T}. Applying Equations (15) and Proposition 4.7, we obtain on
{τj+1 < T},
X∗1 (τj+1−)− η1(τj+1, X∗(τj+1−)) = −
c1,2(τj+1; ρ)
c1,1(τj+1; ρ)
X∗2 (τj+1−) > 0
and the respective result for X∗2 . The assertion now follows by induction on j. The remaining cases follow
accordingly.
(ii) We assume x1, x2, ρ > 0. It is clear that τ > t a.s. The result follows from Equations (15) and Proposi-
tion 4.7 as for t ≤ s < τ ,
η1(s,X
∗(s)) = X∗1 (s) +
c1,2(s; ρ)
c1,1(s; ρ)
X∗2 (s) > X
∗
1 (s).
Proof of Proposition 4.9. The assertions follow directly from Equations (14) and (15) by applying Proposi-
tion 4.7.
For the proof of Proposition 4.10, we require the following results about the monotonicity of ci,i and c1,2 in
t.
Lemma 6.3. For i = 1, 2 and t ∈ [0, T ), ci,i(t) is increasing in t. c1,2(t) is decreasing in t if ρ > 0 and
increasing in t if ρ < 0.
Proof. For fixed l ≥ l0, we consider the Initial Value Problem (3); its solution C(l) satisfies C(l)′ ≥ Q(l)′, where
Q(l) solves the initial value problem Q′ = 1/λminQ2 − ασminI, Q(T ) = lI (cf. Notation 3.1). As in the proof of
Proposition 3.4, Q(l) can be computed explicitly with Q(l)′(t) > 0 for l large enough, say l ≥ l1; in particular
c′i,i(l, t) > 0 and therefore c′i,i(t) ≥ 0.
For the monotonicity of c1,2 we assume ρ > 0 and consider the Initial Value Problem (52) for c1,2(l, t). Note
first that for all l, c′1,2(l, T ) = −αρσ1σ2 < 0. Furthermore,
c′′1,2(l, t) = c
′
1,2(l, t)
(c1,1(l, t)
λ1
+
c2,2(l, t)
λ2
+ θ1 + θ2
)
+ c1,2(l, t)
(c′1,1(l, t)
λ1
+
c′2,2(l, t)
λ2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 for l≥l1
.
This implies c′1,2(l, t) < 0 for l ≥ l1 and hence c′1,2(t) ≤ 0. The case ρ < 0 follows accordingly.
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Proof of Proposition 4.10. We assume ρ > 0 and that the dark pool order for the first asset is executed at time
τ1, i.e., X∗1 (τ1) = − c1,2(τ1)c1,1(τ1)X∗2 (τ1); we further assume X∗2 (τ1) > 0. We have ξ∗1(τ1) = 0 and ξ∗2(τ1) > 0. As
c1,2(s)/ci,i(s) is decreasing in s by Lemma 6.3, we have ξ∗2(s) > 0 and ξ∗1(s) < 0 (in particular η∗2(s) > 0 and
η∗1(τ1) < 0) until the next jump time of pi. The result follows inductively as the number of jumps is almost
surely finite. The proof for the remaining cases is analog.
Proof of Proposition 4.11. The first assertion follows directly from the definition of the cost functional J . For
the second assertion, let λi < λ˜i. Then,
v(t, x;λi)
λi
= E
[ ∫ T
t
(
ξ∗i (s)
2 +
∑
j 6=i
λj
λi
ξ∗j (s)
2 +
α
λi
X∗(s)>ΣX∗(s)
)
ds
]
≥ E
[ ∫ T
t
(
ξ∗i (s)
2 +
∑
j 6=i
λj
λ˜i
ξ∗j (s)
2 +
α
λ˜i
X∗(s)>ΣX∗(s)
)
ds
]
≥ v(t, x; λ˜i)
λ˜i
.
Proof of Proposition 4.12. (i) We prove the case x1, x2 > 0, ρ < 0, i.e., x is well diversified, and modify the
proof of Proposition 4.5. Let u∗ be the optimal strategy for the initial portfolio position (x1,−x2)>. For
(x1, x2)
>, we can define a strategy u ∈ A(t, (x1, x2)>) with the following properties: for s ≤ τ1 (where τ1
is the first jump time of pi)
|ξi(s)| = |ξu∗i |, |Xui (s)| ≤ |Xu
∗
i (s)|, (53)
sgn(ξu
∗
1 (s)) = sgn(ξ
u∗
2 (s))⇒ sgn(ξ1(s)) = sgn(ξ2(s)),
sgn(Xu
∗
1 (s)) = sgn(X
u∗
2 (s))⇒ sgn(Xu1 (s)) = sgn(Xu2 (s)).
u needs to be defined carefully by considering all possible combinations of the signs of the trading intensi-
ties; note that it can be necessary to change the signs of the positions. We adjust the dark pool orders in
such a way that Xui (τ1) ∈ {γXu
∗
i (τ1),−γXu
∗
i (τ1)} for some γ ≤ 1 (cf. the inequality in (53)). For s ≥ τ1,
we proceed similarly as before by defining ξi(s) = γξu∗i (s) (or ξi(s) = −γξu∗i (s)) and the dark pool orders
as before.
This ensures that the impact costs of u are less or equal than the impact costs of u∗ while the risk costs
are strictly smaller; hence the assertion follows inductively. The remaining cases follow by the same line
of reasoning.
(ii), (iii) As in the proof of Proposition 4.7 (i), we obtain that sgn(c1,2(t; ρ, λ1,2)) = sgn(λ1,2) = sgn(ρ). The
assertions follow from the fact that η∗ is as in Equations (15) (also in the presence of cross price impact).
Proof of Proposition 4.13. Let θi ≤ θ˜i. For any matrix C > 0, we have C˜(θi) ≥ C˜(θ˜i) (cf. Equation (4)).
Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we obtain that the respective solutions of the Initial Value Problem (3)
fulfill C(l, t; θ˜i) ≤ C(l, t; θi) for l large enough. The assertion follows by taking the limit l→∞.
Appendix
A Riccati matrix differential equations
In this section, we state a well-known comparison result about matrix Riccati Equations in the form in which
we apply it in the proof of Theorem 3.2. A standard textbook is the one by Reid [1972]. A proof for the specific
form of the theorem can, e.g., be found in Kratz [2011].
Theorem A.1. Let A(t), BP (t), CP (t), BQ(t), CQ(t) ∈ Rn×n be piecewise continuous on R. Furthermore, let
BP (t), CP (t), BQ(t), CQ(t) (t ∈ R) and SP , SQ ∈ Rn×n be symmetric. Let t0 > t1 ≥ −∞ and
SQ ≤ SP , 0 ≤ BQ(·) ≤ BP (·), CP (·) ≤ CQ(·)
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on (t2, t0]. Assume that the initial value problem
P ′ = −A>P − PA− PBPP + CP , P (t0) = SP
possesses a solution P on (t1, t0]. Then the initial value problem
Q′ = −A>Q−QA−QBQQ+ CQ, Q(t0) = SQ
possesses a solution Q on (t1, t0] and P (t) ≥ Q(t) on (t1, t0].
We apply the theorem to scalar Riccati equations with constant coefficients and obtain a useful lower bound
for their solution.
Corollary A.2. Let y be the solution of the scalar initial value problem y′ = y2 + ay − b, y(T ) = c, where
a, b ≥ 0, c > 0, b < c2 + ac and d := a2/4 + b > 0. Then for t ∈ (−∞, T ],
y(t) ≥ 1
T − t+ 1c+a/2
− a
2
.
Proof. As d > 0, we have that the solution z of the initial value problem z′ = z2 − d, z(T ) = c+ a/2 fulfills
z(t) ≥ 1
T − t+ 1c+a/2
on (−∞, T ]
(cf. Theorem A.1; compare z with the solution of f ′ = f2, f(T ) = c + a2 ). The assertion follows directly from
the fact that y(t) = z(t)− a/2.
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